Scenario 1: A human brain is converted to a virtual brain through a destructive process (as described in many science-fiction stories). In what sense is this virtual intelligence the same “person” as the original, organic person?
Scenario 2: A human brain is converted to a virtual brain through a non-destructive process. The original, organic person lives on as before. In what sense is this virtual intelligence the same “person” as the original, organic person – is this the same as the answer in scenario 1?
Why this seems to matter: If a virtual version of me is not really me in the sense of being a continuation of my experience, then what does it matter to me if that virtual brain exists, as opposed to some other virtual brain? Is there actually any advantage to working out how to convert people en masse to virtual intelligences?
(I am aware that the questions of identity and “being a continuation of my experience” are vague but I anticipate that replies here will help me get clearer. )
I am not sure about this, but seems to me that in both cases it is the same person. Only in scenario 2 we have two copies that start to diverge at that point; so they are both continuations of the old one, but are not the same as each other.
This does not have a good equivalent in our intuition, because we usually don’t “branch” this way. But you can imagine a magic spell that creates two identical humans from you. Both are you, but from the moment of copying, they start evolving differently, so after some time it is just like two twins, having a shared memory from before that moment.
I can see why a theory of consciousness that argues that you’re not the atoms, but the pattern, wouldn’t care whether that pattern is realized in meat or in silicon, but my subjective experience of continuity of memories is what confirms that I’m still me. Once you copy my mind with zero loss onto a digital, durable substrate, my original brain would still have strong objections to being switched off.
Trans-human thought experiment:
Scenario 1: A human brain is converted to a virtual brain through a destructive process (as described in many science-fiction stories). In what sense is this virtual intelligence the same “person” as the original, organic person?
Scenario 2: A human brain is converted to a virtual brain through a non-destructive process. The original, organic person lives on as before. In what sense is this virtual intelligence the same “person” as the original, organic person – is this the same as the answer in scenario 1?
Why this seems to matter: If a virtual version of me is not really me in the sense of being a continuation of my experience, then what does it matter to me if that virtual brain exists, as opposed to some other virtual brain? Is there actually any advantage to working out how to convert people en masse to virtual intelligences?
(I am aware that the questions of identity and “being a continuation of my experience” are vague but I anticipate that replies here will help me get clearer. )
I am not sure about this, but seems to me that in both cases it is the same person. Only in scenario 2 we have two copies that start to diverge at that point; so they are both continuations of the old one, but are not the same as each other.
This does not have a good equivalent in our intuition, because we usually don’t “branch” this way. But you can imagine a magic spell that creates two identical humans from you. Both are you, but from the moment of copying, they start evolving differently, so after some time it is just like two twins, having a shared memory from before that moment.
In both cases I’d say they’re different persons.
I can see why a theory of consciousness that argues that you’re not the atoms, but the pattern, wouldn’t care whether that pattern is realized in meat or in silicon, but my subjective experience of continuity of memories is what confirms that I’m still me. Once you copy my mind with zero loss onto a digital, durable substrate, my original brain would still have strong objections to being switched off.