Seems important to note that I endorse this comment. Obviously I think it was correct for Solstice to win the overton-window fight (otherwise I’d have made very different life choices). But it’s important to be clear and honest about what happened, and yes, there were some people who were quite unhappy with it, some of whom left, and some of whom remained, quietly annoyed.
I do think it’s also important to note that there are also people who were annoyed or worried initially, went to Solstice, and after a couple years updated to “yeah this isn’t bad in the way I initially thought it was.” (In both cases, the number of people who “still don’t like it” and “have updated to ‘it’s fine’” that I have concretely observed are less than 10, so I’m hesitant to make many generalizations)
I do think Villiam’s general claim of “if you propose a new thing, especially a new confusing thing, there’s a good chance you’ll get a disproportionate amount of vocal opposition compared to support” is true and noteworthy. (this isn’t quite how they framed it initially and I’m not sure this is what they meant, but it is what I interpreted them to mean, if I interpreted wrong please correct me)
“if you propose a new thing, especially a new confusing thing, there’s a good chance you’ll get a disproportionate amount of vocal opposition compared to support” … if I interpreted wrong please correct me
Yes, this is how I meant it, but in context of Less Wrong especially when the new thing is about rationalist having some emotional experience and becoming closer to each other. Even if it is an obviously voluntary activity no one is pressured to join. Unusual and confusing suggestions that would involve studying math or playing poker would not get that intensity of reaction.
(The surprising part is why singing songs together or living in the Dragon Army house is perceived as more dangerous than polyamory. But maybe because the idea of polyamory came first, so the people who strongly objected to that were already gone when the other ideas came.)
Obviously I think it was correct for Solstice to win the overton-window fight (otherwise I’d have made very different life choices)
And, to be clear, I do not have any meta-objection to this (which is to say, my object-level opinion is the same as it ever was—I think this choice that rationalist communities collectively made was a poor one—but I have no principled objection to “we, as a community, decided to go a certain way, and if some folks don’t care for that, that’s unfortunate, but this is what we’re doing”).
But, yes, pretending that that’s not what happened—pretending that actually, the dissenters just turned out to be obviously silly and their objections were groundless and now they’ve quietly accepted how wrong they were all along, now that their wrongness is plain for all to see—is not acceptable at all.
I do think it’s also important to note that there are also people who were annoyed or worried initially, went to Solstice, and after a couple years updated to “yeah this isn’t bad in the way I initially thought it was.”
Indeed. If I may ask—do you know of any people who initially were in favor / cautiously optimistic / ambivalent / etc., but later updated to “actually this is bad”?
In both cases, the number of people who “still don’t like it” and “have updated to ‘it’s fine’” that I have concretely observed are less than 10, so I’m hesitant to make many generalizations
I, too, have only a handful of data points, so indeed I don’t propose to generalize, but I do want to note that you are rather less likely to observe “still don’t like it” than you are to observe “actually this is fine”, conditional on the existence of each, simply because you’re less likely to interact with people of the latter persuasion!
I have not heard anyone update starting from “this was okay” and then later “this was bad” direction. (If anyone happens to be reading along and had that experience this is as good a time as any to speak up)
(My recollection of your own experience, after coming to a Solstice once, was that you said something afterwards like “okay, yeah that was still cringey but less cringey than I thought. I *am* worried about the use of the Litany of Tarski.” [which is no longer part of Solstice].
It seems like as good a time as any to check if that memory of mine is accurate).
I remember having that conversation, but not the details of what I said. Your version sounds plausible, based on my overall recollection of the event.
(I suppose I should note, for anyone reading this, that the Solstice event I attended was one of the very early ones. It was held at a group house here in Brooklyn, and done as part of a more general gathering; this was before the Solstice celebration as such was made into a separate event, with a rented event space, etc. That is the only Solstice celebration I have attended, so I have no comment on what those that’ve been held since then are like.)
I do think Villiam’s general claim of “if you propose a new thing, especially a new confusing thing, there’s a good chance you’ll get a disproportionate amount of vocal opposition compared to support” is true and noteworthy.
It’s certainly true, but is it really noteworthy?
What I mean is: of course you’re going to get more opposition than support when you propose a confusing new thing. Not only is this expected, but it is (it seems to me) correct!
Change is bad. Any change must justify itself, must offer not merely some benefit (itself an uncertain outcome), but enough benefit to overcome the inherent badness of any change whatsoever. And if the new thing is not just new, not just untested, but confusing? Why, that’s twice the burden of justification—at least!
Now, there are bad and ill-considered objections to anything, even to the worst things. (“Let’s all jump off the Verrazzano Bridge” is a poor idea, but if your objection to this plan is “But what if someone laughs at me? I’d be mortified!”, you are being extremely foolish…) But while some of the arguments against both the Solstice and Dragon Army were, indeed, low-quality ones, some of the most serious objections stemmed from a (perceived) lack of acknowledgment of this burden of justification—a lack of sense that the plan’s authors were cognizant of the reasons why reasonable people might have reservations, at least, about going forward.
It is all too easy to paint anyone who’s less than enthusiastic about your plan as a reflexive objector. Yet I find that the most vocal opposition is often aroused by exactly those plans which are made, and presented, with the certainty that no one could possibly object except for bad reasons.
Change is bad. Any change must justify itself, must offer not merely some benefit (itself an uncertain outcome), but enough benefit to overcome the inherent badness of any change whatsoever.
If you advocate that common resources should be spent on X instead of Y that’s change that needs justification.
If you however want to spend your own resources on creating a new event, I don’t see why you should have to justify yourself to other people beyond what you need to do to encourage them to come to your event. I would want people to start new events without feeling the need to justify themselves.
After the event is over it’s much easier to see what worked and what didn’t. Experimenting with different events is valuable.
I can certainly see a few reasons why one could have this assumption, but assuming it without arguing it in this case seems to be begging the question.
I am not saying: “change, usually, is bad”, or “it is a good default assumption that a change is bad”, or “change tends to be bad”, or “more often than not, change is bad”, or anything at all similar.
I am saying: change, inherently, is bad. Change is bad merely by virtue of being change. Whatever the actual change is, nevertheless the fact of something changing in any way is, itself, directly, bad.
Now, we have all heard this: “every improvement is, necessarily, a change”—quite so. And of course it is possible for a change to be good on net, which is what we usually call an “improvement”. Nevertheless the question of whether a change is good, on net, must be answered by taking the specific positive benefit of the specific change in question, and subtracting, not only anything that got worse, but also the inherent badness of changing something! You “start with a negative score”, so to speak. Thus it is possible to have a change that has a positive benefit, makes nothing worse, and yet the benefit is small, and does not suffice to overcome that “starting score”; in such a case we might say “yes, if we are choosing between A and B from a neutral starting point, B is a little better; but not so much that it’s worthwhile to change to B, if already at A”.
What is it then? You beg the question again by assuming it while trying to show how its not an assumption.
not only anything that got worse, but also the inherent badness of changing something! You “start with a negative score”,
This isn’t an argument, it’s just restating the premise. To see this, just change all instances of “change is bad” to “change is good” in your argument, and notice how they entire thing is still coherent. You start with a positive score for the change, because of the inherent goodness of change, and so on...
This isn’t an argument, it’s just restating the premise.
Indeed, it’s not an argument—any more than my original comment was an assumption!
To see this, just change all instances of “change is bad” to “change is good” in your argument, and notice how they entire thing is still coherent. You start with a positive score for the change, because of the inherent goodness of change, and so on...
Of course it’s still coherent. Why wouldn’t it be?
You keep calling what I wrote an argument, as if I am trying to prove a statement of fact. But isn’t it obvious that what I’m talking about is a matter of judgment, of value? And the negation of a statement of value is just as coherent as the original…
I don’t know how a personal value judgement fits in with your talk about a “burden of justification.” Why should someone feel the need to justify against your personal value judgement that change is bad? They simply have a different value judgement than you.
Why should someone feel the need to justify against your personal value judgement that change is bad?
Certainly they should not—unless, of course, that value judgment is not idiosyncratic, but common, or near-universal. It seems to me that this is so. You may disagree. In any case, justification is needed to the extent that said value judgment is shared by those affected by, or those evaluating, any change.
That makes sense. I think I was tripped up by your use of the words “is” and “bad”, both of which are ambiguous. Things that might have helped me get your meaning are swapping “is” for “feels”, swapping “bad” for “aversive” or “unpleasant”, and adding the qualifier “for me” or “for many people”.
Of course, if you were under the impression that this is a near universal aversion, it makes less sense to make any of those changes. I suspect that that assumption also underlies the miscommunication of why people didn’t address the “change is aversive” objection in the original post as well—they typical-mind fallacied that change was neutral or good, and you did the reverse.
Seems important to note that I endorse this comment. Obviously I think it was correct for Solstice to win the overton-window fight (otherwise I’d have made very different life choices). But it’s important to be clear and honest about what happened, and yes, there were some people who were quite unhappy with it, some of whom left, and some of whom remained, quietly annoyed.
I do think it’s also important to note that there are also people who were annoyed or worried initially, went to Solstice, and after a couple years updated to “yeah this isn’t bad in the way I initially thought it was.” (In both cases, the number of people who “still don’t like it” and “have updated to ‘it’s fine’” that I have concretely observed are less than 10, so I’m hesitant to make many generalizations)
I do think Villiam’s general claim of “if you propose a new thing, especially a new confusing thing, there’s a good chance you’ll get a disproportionate amount of vocal opposition compared to support” is true and noteworthy. (this isn’t quite how they framed it initially and I’m not sure this is what they meant, but it is what I interpreted them to mean, if I interpreted wrong please correct me)
Yes, this is how I meant it, but in context of Less Wrong especially when the new thing is about rationalist having some emotional experience and becoming closer to each other. Even if it is an obviously voluntary activity no one is pressured to join. Unusual and confusing suggestions that would involve studying math or playing poker would not get that intensity of reaction.
(The surprising part is why singing songs together or living in the Dragon Army house is perceived as more dangerous than polyamory. But maybe because the idea of polyamory came first, so the people who strongly objected to that were already gone when the other ideas came.)
And, to be clear, I do not have any meta-objection to this (which is to say, my object-level opinion is the same as it ever was—I think this choice that rationalist communities collectively made was a poor one—but I have no principled objection to “we, as a community, decided to go a certain way, and if some folks don’t care for that, that’s unfortunate, but this is what we’re doing”).
But, yes, pretending that that’s not what happened—pretending that actually, the dissenters just turned out to be obviously silly and their objections were groundless and now they’ve quietly accepted how wrong they were all along, now that their wrongness is plain for all to see—is not acceptable at all.
Indeed. If I may ask—do you know of any people who initially were in favor / cautiously optimistic / ambivalent / etc., but later updated to “actually this is bad”?
I, too, have only a handful of data points, so indeed I don’t propose to generalize, but I do want to note that you are rather less likely to observe “still don’t like it” than you are to observe “actually this is fine”, conditional on the existence of each, simply because you’re less likely to interact with people of the latter persuasion!
I have not heard anyone update starting from “this was okay” and then later “this was bad” direction. (If anyone happens to be reading along and had that experience this is as good a time as any to speak up)
(My recollection of your own experience, after coming to a Solstice once, was that you said something afterwards like “okay, yeah that was still cringey but less cringey than I thought. I *am* worried about the use of the Litany of Tarski.” [which is no longer part of Solstice].
It seems like as good a time as any to check if that memory of mine is accurate).
I remember having that conversation, but not the details of what I said. Your version sounds plausible, based on my overall recollection of the event.
(I suppose I should note, for anyone reading this, that the Solstice event I attended was one of the very early ones. It was held at a group house here in Brooklyn, and done as part of a more general gathering; this was before the Solstice celebration as such was made into a separate event, with a rented event space, etc. That is the only Solstice celebration I have attended, so I have no comment on what those that’ve been held since then are like.)
Separately from my other comment…
It’s certainly true, but is it really noteworthy?
What I mean is: of course you’re going to get more opposition than support when you propose a confusing new thing. Not only is this expected, but it is (it seems to me) correct!
Change is bad. Any change must justify itself, must offer not merely some benefit (itself an uncertain outcome), but enough benefit to overcome the inherent badness of any change whatsoever. And if the new thing is not just new, not just untested, but confusing? Why, that’s twice the burden of justification—at least!
Now, there are bad and ill-considered objections to anything, even to the worst things. (“Let’s all jump off the Verrazzano Bridge” is a poor idea, but if your objection to this plan is “But what if someone laughs at me? I’d be mortified!”, you are being extremely foolish…) But while some of the arguments against both the Solstice and Dragon Army were, indeed, low-quality ones, some of the most serious objections stemmed from a (perceived) lack of acknowledgment of this burden of justification—a lack of sense that the plan’s authors were cognizant of the reasons why reasonable people might have reservations, at least, about going forward.
It is all too easy to paint anyone who’s less than enthusiastic about your plan as a reflexive objector. Yet I find that the most vocal opposition is often aroused by exactly those plans which are made, and presented, with the certainty that no one could possibly object except for bad reasons.
If you advocate that common resources should be spent on X instead of Y that’s change that needs justification.
If you however want to spend your own resources on creating a new event, I don’t see why you should have to justify yourself to other people beyond what you need to do to encourage them to come to your event. I would want people to start new events without feeling the need to justify themselves.
After the event is over it’s much easier to see what worked and what didn’t. Experimenting with different events is valuable.
I can certainly see a few reasons why one could have this assumption, but assuming it without arguing it in this case seems to be begging the question.
Indeed not, as it is not an assumption at all!
I am not saying: “change, usually, is bad”, or “it is a good default assumption that a change is bad”, or “change tends to be bad”, or “more often than not, change is bad”, or anything at all similar.
I am saying: change, inherently, is bad. Change is bad merely by virtue of being change. Whatever the actual change is, nevertheless the fact of something changing in any way is, itself, directly, bad.
Now, we have all heard this: “every improvement is, necessarily, a change”—quite so. And of course it is possible for a change to be good on net, which is what we usually call an “improvement”. Nevertheless the question of whether a change is good, on net, must be answered by taking the specific positive benefit of the specific change in question, and subtracting, not only anything that got worse, but also the inherent badness of changing something! You “start with a negative score”, so to speak. Thus it is possible to have a change that has a positive benefit, makes nothing worse, and yet the benefit is small, and does not suffice to overcome that “starting score”; in such a case we might say “yes, if we are choosing between A and B from a neutral starting point, B is a little better; but not so much that it’s worthwhile to change to B, if already at A”.
What is it then? You beg the question again by assuming it while trying to show how its not an assumption.
This isn’t an argument, it’s just restating the premise. To see this, just change all instances of “change is bad” to “change is good” in your argument, and notice how they entire thing is still coherent. You start with a positive score for the change, because of the inherent goodness of change, and so on...
Indeed, it’s not an argument—any more than my original comment was an assumption!
Of course it’s still coherent. Why wouldn’t it be?
You keep calling what I wrote an argument, as if I am trying to prove a statement of fact. But isn’t it obvious that what I’m talking about is a matter of judgment, of value? And the negation of a statement of value is just as coherent as the original…
I don’t know how a personal value judgement fits in with your talk about a “burden of justification.” Why should someone feel the need to justify against your personal value judgement that change is bad? They simply have a different value judgement than you.
Certainly they should not—unless, of course, that value judgment is not idiosyncratic, but common, or near-universal. It seems to me that this is so. You may disagree. In any case, justification is needed to the extent that said value judgment is shared by those affected by, or those evaluating, any change.
That makes sense. I think I was tripped up by your use of the words “is” and “bad”, both of which are ambiguous. Things that might have helped me get your meaning are swapping “is” for “feels”, swapping “bad” for “aversive” or “unpleasant”, and adding the qualifier “for me” or “for many people”.
Of course, if you were under the impression that this is a near universal aversion, it makes less sense to make any of those changes. I suspect that that assumption also underlies the miscommunication of why people didn’t address the “change is aversive” objection in the original post as well—they typical-mind fallacied that change was neutral or good, and you did the reverse.