From an omniscient point of view, yes. From my point of view, probably not, but there are still problems that arise relating to this, that can cause logic-based agents to get very confused.
Let A be an agent, considering options X and not-X. Suppose A |- Action=not-X → Utility=0. The naive approach to this would be to say: if A |- Action=X → Utility<0, A will do not-X, and if A |- Action=X → Utility>0, A will do X. Suppose further that A knows its source code, so it knows this is the case. Consider the statement G=(A |- G) → (Action=X → Utility<0). It can be constructed by using Godel-numbering and quines. Present A with the following argument:
Suppose for the sake of argument that A |- G. Then A |- (A |- G), since A knows its source code. Also, by definition of G, A |- (A |- G) → (Action=X → Utility<0). By modus ponens, A |- (Action=X → Utility<0). Therefore, by our assumption about A, A will do not-X: Action!=X. But, vacuously, this means that (Action=X → Utility<0). Since we have proved this by assuming A |- G, we know that (A |- G) → (Action=X → Utility<0), in other words, we know G.
The argument then goes, similarly to above: A |- G A |- (A |- G) A |- (A |- G) → (Action=X → Utility<0) A |- (Action=X → Utility<0) Action=Not-X
We proved this without knowing anything about X. This shows that naive logical implication can easily lead one astray. The standard solution to this problem is the chicken rule, making it so that if A ever proves which action it will take, it will immediately take the opposite action, which avoids the argument presented above, but is defeated by Troll Bridge, even when the agent has good logical uncertainty.
These problems seem to me to show that logical uncertainty about the action one will take, paired with logical implications about what the result will be if you take a particular action, are insufficient to describe a good decision theory.
From an omniscient point of view, yes. From my point of view, probably not, but there are still problems that arise relating to this, that can cause logic-based agents to get very confused.
Let A be an agent, considering options X and not-X. Suppose A |- Action=not-X → Utility=0. The naive approach to this would be to say: if A |- Action=X → Utility<0, A will do not-X, and if A |- Action=X → Utility>0, A will do X. Suppose further that A knows its source code, so it knows this is the case.
Consider the statement G=(A |- G) → (Action=X → Utility<0). It can be constructed by using Godel-numbering and quines. Present A with the following argument:
Suppose for the sake of argument that A |- G. Then A |- (A |- G), since A knows its source code. Also, by definition of G, A |- (A |- G) → (Action=X → Utility<0). By modus ponens, A |- (Action=X → Utility<0). Therefore, by our assumption about A, A will do not-X: Action!=X. But, vacuously, this means that (Action=X → Utility<0). Since we have proved this by assuming A |- G, we know that (A |- G) → (Action=X → Utility<0), in other words, we know G.
The argument then goes, similarly to above:
A |- G
A |- (A |- G)
A |- (A |- G) → (Action=X → Utility<0)
A |- (Action=X → Utility<0)
Action=Not-X
We proved this without knowing anything about X. This shows that naive logical implication can easily lead one astray. The standard solution to this problem is the chicken rule, making it so that if A ever proves which action it will take, it will immediately take the opposite action, which avoids the argument presented above, but is defeated by Troll Bridge, even when the agent has good logical uncertainty.
These problems seem to me to show that logical uncertainty about the action one will take, paired with logical implications about what the result will be if you take a particular action, are insufficient to describe a good decision theory.
I am not aware of a good reason to believe that a perfect decision theory is even possible, or that counterfactuals of any sort are the main obstacle.