The point is that all the people making cars in the company could, in principle, do the same job as self employed freelance contractors rather than as employees. Instead of a company you have lots of contracts between eg assembly line workers, salespeople and end customers, without any companies. The same number of cars could in theory be built by the same number of people in each case. The physical scenario would be identical in each case. The machinery would be identical in each case. But in the freelancer case you still have lots of people building cars but there is no invisible company to coordinate this activity instead you are relying the market.
The main problems are the number of contracts and the relationship management problem. Once upon a time drawing up and enforcing the required number of contracts would have been prohibitevly expensive in terms of fees for lawyers. In the modern era Web 3.0 promised smart contracts to solve this kind of problem. But smart contracts don’t solve the problem of incomplete contracts https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incomplete_contracts, and this in itself can be seen as a transaction cost in the form of a risk premium. and so we are stuck with companies. In the theory of the firm companies are indeed a bit like socialist enclaves. Individuals give up some of their autonomy and agree not to compete with fellow employees in order to reduce their transaction costs. As you point out the flip side of this is that it can create new principal agent problems, but these are rarely insurmountable. The principal agent problems that we should really worry about are the ones that occur between companies, particularly in financial services. It was a principal agent conflict between rating agencies and investment banks that led to the great financial crisis, as dramatised in the film the Big Short.
The point is that all the people making cars in the company could, in principle, do the same job as self employed freelance contractors rather than as employees. Instead of a company you have lots of contracts between eg assembly line workers, salespeople and end customers, without any companies. The same number of cars could in theory be built by the same number of people in each case. The physical scenario would be identical in each case. The machinery would be identical in each case. But in the freelancer case you still have lots of people building cars but there is no invisible company to coordinate this activity instead you are relying the market.
Oh yeah, I see. Very interesting. Do any other transaction costs come to mind?
The main problems are the number of contracts and the relationship management problem. Once upon a time drawing up and enforcing the required number of contracts would have been prohibitevly expensive in terms of fees for lawyers. In the modern era Web 3.0 promised smart contracts to solve this kind of problem. But smart contracts don’t solve the problem of incomplete contracts https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incomplete_contracts, and this in itself can be seen as a transaction cost in the form of a risk premium. and so we are stuck with companies. In the theory of the firm companies are indeed a bit like socialist enclaves. Individuals give up some of their autonomy and agree not to compete with fellow employees in order to reduce their transaction costs. As you point out the flip side of this is that it can create new principal agent problems, but these are rarely insurmountable. The principal agent problems that we should really worry about are the ones that occur between companies, particularly in financial services. It was a principal agent conflict between rating agencies and investment banks that led to the great financial crisis, as dramatised in the film the Big Short.