The goal we like to aim for here in “dissolving” problems is not just to show that the question was wrongheaded, but thoroughly explain why we were motivated to ask the question in the first place. ¶ If qualia don’t exist for anyone, what causes so many people to believe they exist and to describe them in such similar ways? Why does virtually everyone with a philosophical bent rediscover the “hard problem”
I think this objection applies to Dennett or Churchland’s account but not to mine. The reason the qualia problem is compelling, on my account, is that we have an innate intuition of direct experience. There is indeed some mystery about why we have such an intuition when, on the analysis I provide, the intuition seems to serve no useful purpose, but the answer to that question lies in evolution.
The only answer to “why we were motivated to ask the question?” is the answer to “why did evolution equip us with this nonfunctional intuition?” What other question might you have in mind?
But I don’t follow that “merely showing a problem is wrongheaded” would be tantamount to “just [rationalizing] it away.” You would be justified in declining to count a showing of wrongheadedness as a complete dissolution, but that doesn’t make a demonstration of wrongheadedness unsound. The reasonable response to such a showing is to conclude that there are no qualia and then to look for the answers to why they seem compelling.
I think this objection applies to Dennett or Churchland’s account but not to mine. The reason the qualia problem is compelling, on my account, is that we have an innate intuition of direct experience. There is indeed some mystery about why we have such an intuition when, on the analysis I provide, the intuition seems to serve no useful purpose, but the answer to that question lies in evolution.
The only answer to “why we were motivated to ask the question?” is the answer to “why did evolution equip us with this nonfunctional intuition?” What other question might you have in mind?
A suggested answer to the evolutionary question is contained in another essay, “The supposedly hard problem of consciousness and the nonexistence of sense data: Is your dog a conscious being?”.
But I don’t follow that “merely showing a problem is wrongheaded” would be tantamount to “just [rationalizing] it away.” You would be justified in declining to count a showing of wrongheadedness as a complete dissolution, but that doesn’t make a demonstration of wrongheadedness unsound. The reasonable response to such a showing is to conclude that there are no qualia and then to look for the answers to why they seem compelling.