What about a situation where the threat would be considered non-credible because the cost to A of carrying out on it would cost more than not carrying it out, regardless whether B gives in, but A decides to carryout on it anyway with the sole objective to inflict more damage on B? Example A doesn’t carryout threat, B doesn’t give in payout is 0,0 ; A doesn’t carryout threat, B gives in payout is 0,-5 ; A carries out threat, B gives in payout is 0,-10; A carries out threat, B doesn’t give in payout is −10,-100. These situatiions happen often. A big flaw of Game Theory is to assume that agents act rationally.
I’m confused about your suggested payoffs. It looks to me like in your example, A is indifferent between no one does anything, and B gives in to A’s threats. In this situation there is not even an incentive for A to threaten B.
A black mail situation is a situation where A prefers B to give in, over noting happens. But also if B don’t give in, A have to give up some utility to in order to follow through with their treat. For this situation see my other response.
I agree that classical game theory (to the extent I understand it) don’t describe blackmail. I disagree that the game theory definition of “rational” is always the best action.
Game theory (again to my best understanding) assumes optimal behaviour according to CDT. The problem with CDT is that it predictably don’t stick to commitments. This is predictably bad in many ways. See for example Parfit’s Hitchhiker, and there is a similar situation around blackmail or commitment to costly retaliation.
Because CDT predictably fails in these situations, I think it is wrong to claim that it’s always rational to act according to CDT. Rationality is winning after all.
What about a situation where the threat would be considered non-credible because the cost to A of carrying out on it would cost more than not carrying it out, regardless whether B gives in, but A decides to carryout on it anyway with the sole objective to inflict more damage on B? Example A doesn’t carryout threat, B doesn’t give in payout is 0,0 ; A doesn’t carryout threat, B gives in payout is 0,-5 ; A carries out threat, B gives in payout is 0,-10; A carries out threat, B doesn’t give in payout is −10,-100. These situatiions happen often. A big flaw of Game Theory is to assume that agents act rationally.
I’m confused about your suggested payoffs. It looks to me like in your example, A is indifferent between no one does anything, and B gives in to A’s threats. In this situation there is not even an incentive for A to threaten B.
A black mail situation is a situation where A prefers B to give in, over noting happens. But also if B don’t give in, A have to give up some utility to in order to follow through with their treat. For this situation see my other response.
I agree that classical game theory (to the extent I understand it) don’t describe blackmail. I disagree that the game theory definition of “rational” is always the best action.
Game theory (again to my best understanding) assumes optimal behaviour according to CDT. The problem with CDT is that it predictably don’t stick to commitments. This is predictably bad in many ways. See for example Parfit’s Hitchhiker, and there is a similar situation around blackmail or commitment to costly retaliation.
Because CDT predictably fails in these situations, I think it is wrong to claim that it’s always rational to act according to CDT. Rationality is winning after all.