more or less any level of intelligence could in principle be combined with more or less any final goal.
The “in principle” still allows for the possibility of a naturalistic view of morality grounding moral truths. For example, we could have the concept of: the morality that advanced evolutionary systems tend to converge on—despite the orthogonality thesis.
It doesn’t say what is likely to happen. It says what might happen in principle. It’s a big difference.
Note that on Eliezer’s view, nothing like “the morality that advanced evolutionary systems tend to converge on” is required for moral realism. Do you think it’s required?
The thesis says:
The “in principle” still allows for the possibility of a naturalistic view of morality grounding moral truths. For example, we could have the concept of: the morality that advanced evolutionary systems tend to converge on—despite the orthogonality thesis.
It doesn’t say what is likely to happen. It says what might happen in principle. It’s a big difference.
Note that on Eliezer’s view, nothing like “the morality that advanced evolutionary systems tend to converge on” is required for moral realism. Do you think it’s required?
I usually try to avoid the term “moral realism”—due to associated ambiguities—and abuse of the term “realism”.