I like it—I think one could specify an automatic method for striking a fair bargain between states (and only include states that use that method in the bargain). Then you could have states join the compact asynchronously.
E.g. if the goal is to have the pre-campaign expected electors be the same, and Texas went 18⁄40 Biden in 2020 while California went 20⁄54 Trump in 2020, maybe in 2024 Texas assigns all its electors proportionally, while California assigns 49 electors proportionally and the remaining 5 by majority. That would cause the numbers to work out the same (plus or minus a rounding error).
Suppose Connecticut also wants to join the compact, but it’s also a blue state. I think the obvious thing to do is to distribute the expected minority electors proportional to total elector count—if Connecticut has 7 electors, it’s responsible for balancing 7⁄61 of the 18 minority electors that are being traded, or just about exactly 2 of them.
But the rounding is sometimes awkward—if we lived in a universe where Connecticut had 9 electors instead, it would be responsible for just about exactly 2.5 minority electors, which is super awkward especially if a lot of small states join and start accumulating rounding errors.
What you could do instead is specify a loss function: you take the variance of the proportion of electors assigned proportionally among the states that are on the ‘majority’ side of the deal, multiply that by a constant (probably something small like 0.05, but obviously you do some simulations and pick something more informed), add the squared rounding error of expected minority electors, and that’s your measure for how imperfect the assignment of proportional electors to states is. Then you just pick the assignment that’s least imperfect.
Add in some automated escape hatches in case of change of major parties, change of voting system, or being superseded by a more ambitious interstate compact, and bada bing.
I don’t see any reason to structure this agreement as an open-ended compact other states can join instead of a bilateral agreement between just California and Texas as proposed.
(The same reasoning applied to the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact would have its membership closed as soon as they reach a majority in electoral votes, and then completely disregard the votes of any state that didn’t sign on, voting in whoever gets the most votes in member states.)
So a proportional vote interstate compact? :)
I like it—I think one could specify an automatic method for striking a fair bargain between states (and only include states that use that method in the bargain). Then you could have states join the compact asynchronously.
E.g. if the goal is to have the pre-campaign expected electors be the same, and Texas went 18⁄40 Biden in 2020 while California went 20⁄54 Trump in 2020, maybe in 2024 Texas assigns all its electors proportionally, while California assigns 49 electors proportionally and the remaining 5 by majority. That would cause the numbers to work out the same (plus or minus a rounding error).
Suppose Connecticut also wants to join the compact, but it’s also a blue state. I think the obvious thing to do is to distribute the expected minority electors proportional to total elector count—if Connecticut has 7 electors, it’s responsible for balancing 7⁄61 of the 18 minority electors that are being traded, or just about exactly 2 of them.
But the rounding is sometimes awkward—if we lived in a universe where Connecticut had 9 electors instead, it would be responsible for just about exactly 2.5 minority electors, which is super awkward especially if a lot of small states join and start accumulating rounding errors.
What you could do instead is specify a loss function: you take the variance of the proportion of electors assigned proportionally among the states that are on the ‘majority’ side of the deal, multiply that by a constant (probably something small like 0.05, but obviously you do some simulations and pick something more informed), add the squared rounding error of expected minority electors, and that’s your measure for how imperfect the assignment of proportional electors to states is. Then you just pick the assignment that’s least imperfect.
Add in some automated escape hatches in case of change of major parties, change of voting system, or being superseded by a more ambitious interstate compact, and bada bing.
I don’t see any reason to structure this agreement as an open-ended compact other states can join instead of a bilateral agreement between just California and Texas as proposed.
(The same reasoning applied to the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact would have its membership closed as soon as they reach a majority in electoral votes, and then completely disregard the votes of any state that didn’t sign on, voting in whoever gets the most votes in member states.)