Note that these people believing this thing to be true does not in fact make it any likelier to be false. We judge it to be less {more likely to be true} than we would for a generic positing by a generic person, down to the point of no suspicion one way or the other, but this positing is not in fact reversed into a positive impression that something is false.
If one takes two otherwise-identical worlds (unlikely, I grant), one in which a large body of people X posit Y for (patently?) fallacious reasons and one in which that large body of people posit the completely-unrelated Z instead, then it seems that a rational (?) individual in both worlds should have roughly the same impression on whether Y is true or false, rather than in the one world believing Y to be very likely to be false.
One may not give the stupid significant credence when they claim it to be day, but one still doesn’t believe it any more likely to be night (than one did before).
((As likely noted elsewhere, the bias-acknowledgement situation results in humans being variably treated as more stupid and less stupid depending on local topic of conversation, due to blind spot specificity.))
Note that these people believing this thing to be true does not in fact make it any likelier to be false. We judge it to be less {more likely to be true} than we would for a generic positing by a generic person, down to the point of no suspicion one way or the other, but this positing is not in fact reversed into a positive impression that something is false.
If one takes two otherwise-identical worlds (unlikely, I grant), one in which a large body of people X posit Y for (patently?) fallacious reasons and one in which that large body of people posit the completely-unrelated Z instead, then it seems that a rational (?) individual in both worlds should have roughly the same impression on whether Y is true or false, rather than in the one world believing Y to be very likely to be false.
One may not give the stupid significant credence when they claim it to be day, but one still doesn’t believe it any more likely to be night (than one did before).
((As likely noted elsewhere, the bias-acknowledgement situation results in humans being variably treated as more stupid and less stupid depending on local topic of conversation, due to blind spot specificity.))