Aren’t there situations (at least in some virtue-ethics systems) where it’s fundamentally impossible to reduce (or reconcile) virtue-ethics to consequentialism because actions tending towards the same consequence are called both virtuous and unvirtuous depending on who does them? (Or, conversely, where virtuous conduct calls for people to do things whose consequences are in direct opposition.)
For example, the Iliad portrays both Achilles (Greek) and Hector (Trojan) as embodying the virtues of bravery/loyalty/etc. for fighting for their respective sides, even though Achilles’s consequentialist goal is for Troy to fall, and Hector’s is for that not to happen. Is this an accurate characterization of how virtue-ethics works? Is it possible to explain this in a consequentialist frame?
Aren’t there situations (at least in some virtue-ethics systems) where it’s fundamentally impossible to reduce (or reconcile) virtue-ethics to consequentialism because actions tending towards the same consequence are called both virtuous and unvirtuous depending on who does them? (Or, conversely, where virtuous conduct calls for people to do things whose consequences are in direct opposition.)
This is most likely to happen if an ethical system is particularly naive, in the sense that it’s excessively top down, trying to function as a simple, consistent system, rather than trying to account for the nuanced complexity of real world situations. But, yes, I think sometimes virtue ethicists and consequentialists may reasonably come to different conclusions about what’s best to do. For example, maybe I would reject something a consequentialist thinks should be done because I’d say doing so would be undignified. Maybe this would be an error on my part, or maybe this would be an error on the consequentialists part from failing to consider second and third order effects. Hard to say without a specific scenario.
For example, the Iliad portrays both Achilles (Greek) and Hector (Trojan) as embodying the virtues of bravery/loyalty/etc. for fighting for their respective sides, even though Achilles’s consequentialist goal is for Troy to fall, and Hector’s is for that not to happen. Is this an accurate characterization of how virtue-ethics works? Is it possible to explain this in a consequentialist frame?
I think this is not a great example because the virtues being extolled here are orthogonal to the outcome. And consequentialists can choose to value their own side more than the other side, or to be indifferent between sides, so I’m not sure what the conflict between virtue ethics and consequentialism would be here.
I think this is not a great example because the virtues being extolled here are orthogonal to the outcome.
Would it still be possible to explain these virtues in a consequentialist way, or is it only some virtues that can be explained in this way?
And consequentialists can choose to value their own side more than the other side, or to be indifferent between sides, so I’m not sure what the conflict between virtue ethics and consequentialism would be here.
The special difficulty here is that the two sides are following the same virtue-ethics framework, and come into conflict precisely because of that. So, whatever this framework is, it cannot be cashed out into a single corresponding consequentialist framework that gives the same prescriptions.
Aren’t there situations (at least in some virtue-ethics systems) where it’s fundamentally impossible to reduce (or reconcile) virtue-ethics to consequentialism because actions tending towards the same consequence are called both virtuous and unvirtuous depending on who does them? (Or, conversely, where virtuous conduct calls for people to do things whose consequences are in direct opposition.)
For example, the Iliad portrays both Achilles (Greek) and Hector (Trojan) as embodying the virtues of bravery/loyalty/etc. for fighting for their respective sides, even though Achilles’s consequentialist goal is for Troy to fall, and Hector’s is for that not to happen. Is this an accurate characterization of how virtue-ethics works? Is it possible to explain this in a consequentialist frame?
This is most likely to happen if an ethical system is particularly naive, in the sense that it’s excessively top down, trying to function as a simple, consistent system, rather than trying to account for the nuanced complexity of real world situations. But, yes, I think sometimes virtue ethicists and consequentialists may reasonably come to different conclusions about what’s best to do. For example, maybe I would reject something a consequentialist thinks should be done because I’d say doing so would be undignified. Maybe this would be an error on my part, or maybe this would be an error on the consequentialists part from failing to consider second and third order effects. Hard to say without a specific scenario.
I think this is not a great example because the virtues being extolled here are orthogonal to the outcome. And consequentialists can choose to value their own side more than the other side, or to be indifferent between sides, so I’m not sure what the conflict between virtue ethics and consequentialism would be here.
Would it still be possible to explain these virtues in a consequentialist way, or is it only some virtues that can be explained in this way?
The special difficulty here is that the two sides are following the same virtue-ethics framework, and come into conflict precisely because of that. So, whatever this framework is, it cannot be cashed out into a single corresponding consequentialist framework that gives the same prescriptions.