Elinor Ostrom has written several books that would be informative. Much of her work is from the point of view of the incentives that produced particular patterns of cooperation and keep it going over long periods of time. You’ll have to do your own thinking about how to move a particular organization toward a stable norm. Robert Ellicskson’s “Order without Law” is more about dispute settlement among neighbors and enforcing different sets of norms than about organizing groups, but there are interesting examples there, too.
James C. Scott’s “Thinking like a State” talks more about pathological cases from a self-government viewpoint, and doesn’t have much to say about healthy groups.
I would want to expand the taxonomy to include sports leagues for children (children and their parents cycle through on an annual basis, while some core maintains the form of the organization) and HOAs, which are attached to property and have different standard pathologies, since membership is incidental to another goal, but members can impose substantial penalties and incentives on each other,
Elinor Ostrom has written several books that would be informative. Much of her work is from the point of view of the incentives that produced particular patterns of cooperation and keep it going over long periods of time. You’ll have to do your own thinking about how to move a particular organization toward a stable norm. Robert Ellicskson’s “Order without Law” is more about dispute settlement among neighbors and enforcing different sets of norms than about organizing groups, but there are interesting examples there, too.
James C. Scott’s “Thinking like a State” talks more about pathological cases from a self-government viewpoint, and doesn’t have much to say about healthy groups.
I would want to expand the taxonomy to include sports leagues for children (children and their parents cycle through on an annual basis, while some core maintains the form of the organization) and HOAs, which are attached to property and have different standard pathologies, since membership is incidental to another goal, but members can impose substantial penalties and incentives on each other,