I note that in the cooperative bargaining domain, a CDT agent will engage in commitment races, using the commitment mechanism to turn itself into a berzerker, a threatmaker. If they’re sharing a world with other CDT agents, that is all they will do. Whoever’s able to constitutionalize first will make a pre-commitment like “I’ll initiate a nuclear apocalypse if you don’t surrender all of your land to us.”
If they’re sharing the world with UDT agents, they will be able to ascertain that those sorts of threats will be ignored (reflected in the US’s principle of “refusing to negotiate with terrorists”), and recognize that it would just lead to MAD with no chance of a surrender deal. I think commitment mechanisms only lead to good bargaining outcomes if UDT agents already hold a lot of power.
I note that in the cooperative bargaining domain, a CDT agent will engage in commitment races, using the commitment mechanism to turn itself into a berzerker, a threatmaker. If they’re sharing a world with other CDT agents, that is all they will do. Whoever’s able to constitutionalize first will make a pre-commitment like “I’ll initiate a nuclear apocalypse if you don’t surrender all of your land to us.”
If they’re sharing the world with UDT agents, they will be able to ascertain that those sorts of threats will be ignored (reflected in the US’s principle of “refusing to negotiate with terrorists”), and recognize that it would just lead to MAD with no chance of a surrender deal. I think commitment mechanisms only lead to good bargaining outcomes if UDT agents already hold a lot of power.