If you’re giving one number, that IS your all-inclusive probability. You can’t predict the direction that new evidence will change your probability (per https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/conservation-of-expected-evidence), but you CAN predict that there will be evidence with equal probability of each direction.
An example is if you’re flipping a coin twice. Before any flips, you give 0.25 to each of HH, HT, TH, and TT. But you strongly expect to get evidence (observing the flips) that will first change two of them to 0.5 and two to 0, then another update which will change one of the 0.5 to 1 and the other to 0.
Likewise, p(doom) before 2035 - you strongly believe your probability will be 1 or 0 in 2036. You currently believe 6%. You may be able to identify intermediate updates, and specify the balance of probability * update that adds to 0 currently, but will be specific when the evidence is obtained.
I don’t know any shorthand for that—it’s implied by the probability given. If you want to specify your distribution of probable future probability assignments, you can certainly do so, as long as the mean remains 6%. “There’s a 25% chance I’ll update to 15% and a 75% chance of updating to 3% over the next 5 years” is a consistent prediction.
you CAN predict that there will be evidence with equal probability of each direction.
More precisely the expected value of upwards and downwards updates should be the same; it’s nonetheless possible to be very confident that you’ll update in a particular direction—offset by a much larger and proportionately less likely update in the other.
For example, I have some chance of winning. lottery this year, not much lower than if I actually bought a ticket. I’m very confident that each day I’ll give somewhat lower odds (as there’s less time remaining), but being credibly informed that I’ve won would radically change the odds such that the expectation balances out.
If you’re giving one number, that IS your all-inclusive probability. You can’t predict the direction that new evidence will change your probability (per https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/conservation-of-expected-evidence), but you CAN predict that there will be evidence with equal probability of each direction.
An example is if you’re flipping a coin twice. Before any flips, you give 0.25 to each of HH, HT, TH, and TT. But you strongly expect to get evidence (observing the flips) that will first change two of them to 0.5 and two to 0, then another update which will change one of the 0.5 to 1 and the other to 0.
Likewise, p(doom) before 2035 - you strongly believe your probability will be 1 or 0 in 2036. You currently believe 6%. You may be able to identify intermediate updates, and specify the balance of probability * update that adds to 0 currently, but will be specific when the evidence is obtained.
I don’t know any shorthand for that—it’s implied by the probability given. If you want to specify your distribution of probable future probability assignments, you can certainly do so, as long as the mean remains 6%. “There’s a 25% chance I’ll update to 15% and a 75% chance of updating to 3% over the next 5 years” is a consistent prediction.
More precisely the expected value of upwards and downwards updates should be the same; it’s nonetheless possible to be very confident that you’ll update in a particular direction—offset by a much larger and proportionately less likely update in the other.
For example, I have some chance of winning. lottery this year, not much lower than if I actually bought a ticket. I’m very confident that each day I’ll give somewhat lower odds (as there’s less time remaining), but being credibly informed that I’ve won would radically change the odds such that the expectation balances out.