This isn’t productive. As you’ve insisted on a long and highly critical response again, I sadly feel I need to briefly reply.
What you need to disprove is the claim that physicalists employ the concept of consciousness
No. I merely show that the core claims of physicalism and this use of consciousness are incompatible. That’s what I’ve done. Whether some particular physicalists choose to employ some concept is a different question and a massive red herring, as I already said.
One ought to provide evidence for extraordinary claims,
Whereas ordinary claims don’t need evidence? Could you be presenting your claims as “ordinary” to avoid the burden of evidence?
standard theory of consciousness, which almost everyone believes in, including most physicalists.
A “standard” theory of consciousness, that almost everyone believes in, including most physicalist, and presumably most dualists too? Dualists and physicalists have agreed on the nature of consciousness? I think you’ve gone waaaaay into the realms of fantasy on this one.
1 Consciousness doesn’t exist at all.(Eliminativism)
You have warped my position again. I didn’t argue it didn’t exist, I argued that it is a concept that is rooted in dualism. I explained why. I argued that a physicalist would be consistent if they instead used concepts drawn from empirical investigations of the brain. You seem to feel that the physical should be conceptualised based upon the mental, rather than the other way around. That position isn’t compatible with physicalism, because it implies treating the mental as categorically superior. Doing so is not an ontologically neutral position as you are presenting it.
Nobody has at any stage said anything to imply that introspection is, or needs to be, more reliable than conventional empiricism.
If so then why are you treating concepts derived from pure introspection as the superior schema to categorise empirical evidence?
You need to argue that point … [etc.]
I did, you selectively ignored the arguments. This conversation has become largely pointless. Perhaps you feel you can achieve some goal of “winning” by merely repeating yourself and achieving “victory” by the other person losing faith in the merit of the conversation. Your basic approach seems to be (1) find some minor points that you can rephrase and attack (2) simply ignore the main points and claim over and over again the main proposition hasn’t been proven. (3) deny the need to support your own claims when asked because they are conventional or “ordinary”. As such I think it would be a mistake for me to see you as honestly engaged with my propositions here. That’s a shame, because I think you would be a very interesting person to talk to if you weren’t so eager to “win”. Good luck and goodbye.
They don’t need the re-presentation of existing evidence.
A “standard” theory of consciousness, that almost everyone believes in, including most physicalist, and presumably most dualists too? Dualists and physicalists have agreed on the nature of consciousness?
They disagree about some things, and they agree enough to be talking about the same thing. Disagreement requires commonalities , otherwise it’s just miscommumication.
1 Consciousness doesn’t exist at all.(Eliminativism)
You have warped my position again. I didn’t argue it didn’t exist,
I didn’t say you were eliminativist. I said you were shoehorning three categories into two categories. What is your response to that?
. I explained why. I argued that a physicalist would be consistent if they instead used concepts drawn from empirical investigations of the brain. You seem to feel that the physical should be conceptualised based upon the mental, rather than the other way around.
Both versions are naive. The explanatory process doesn’t start with a perfect set of concepts...reality isn’t pre-labelled. The explanatory process start with a set of “folk” or prima facie concepts, each of which may be retained, modified, or discarded as things are better understood. You cant start from nothing because you have to be able to state your explanandum, you have to state which phenomenon you are trying to explain. But having to have to a starting point does not prejudice the process forever, since the modification and abandonment options are available. For instance, the concept of phlogiston was abandoned, whereas the concept the atom was modified to no longer require indivisibility. Heat is a favourite example of a reductive explanation. The concept of heat as something to be explained was retained, but the earlier, non reductive explanation of heat as a kind of substance was abandoned, in favour of identifying heat with molecular motion. Since molecular motion exits, heat exists, but it doesn’t exist separately—dualistically—from everything else. This style of explanation is what non eliminative physicalists, the type 2 position, are aiming at.
That position isn’t compatible with physicalism, because it implies treating the mental as categorically superior.
Your background assumptions are wrong. There aren’t any inherently, unchangeably, mental concepts. If you can reduce something to physics, like heat, then it’s physical. You don’t know in advance what you can reduce. The different positions on the nature of consciousness are different guesses or bets on the outcome. Non eliminating physicalism, the type 2 position is bet on the outcome that consciousness will be identified with some physical process. at which point it will no longer be a “dualistic concept”.
Nobody has at any stage said anything to imply that introspection is, or needs to be, more reliable than conventional empiricism.
If so then why are you treating concepts derived from pure introspection as the superior schema to categorise empirical evidence?
I am not using concepts derived from introspection. The very fact of introspection indicates that consciousness, by a fairly minimal definition, is existent. Why do you ignore introspection? Why not look down the telescope?
There aren’t any inherently, unchangeably, mental concepts.
From what I can observe in your position it seems like you are treating consciousness in exactly this way. For example, could you explain how it could possibly be challenged by evidence? How could it change or be refined if we say “introspection therefore consciousness”?
The very fact of introspection indicates that consciousness, by a fairly minimal definition, is existent.
I don’t see how this follows. As there are a whole host of definitions of consciousness, could you explicitly select a definition, and explain why you feel that introspection proves that particular definintion (not just a general sense of introspectionyness) must follow? Consciousness definitions usually imply some form of discrete mental agent, endowed with certain fairly significant properties. I don’t see how that follows from “person A can’t see what person B is thinking”, unless you invoke dualism. We need to understand what thought is first, and we would need a very compelling reason a physicalist would seek to derive concepts to deal with thought from disembodied thought itself rather than the physical world as they observe it.
Positions:
1 Consciousness doesn’t exist at all.(Eliminativism) 2 Consciousness exists as a reducible physical phenomenon (physicalism) 3 Consciousness exists as an irreducible non physical phenomenal.(dualism)
I’m not conflating these positions as I feel you probably think I am, merely holding that (2) is not logically consistent. If (2) was “when we observe the brain we see a discrete phenomenon that we call consciousness”, I would say that it is more logically consistent, though I would call for a different word that isn’t historically associated with dualism.
Why do you ignore introspection? Why not look down the telescope?
I don’t wish to ignore it. I merely think a consistent physicalist would categorise it, like everything else, as a physical process, and therefore seek to understand and explain it using empirical evidence rather than purely mental concepts that don’t seem to exist in physical space?
I finally note you refuse again to accept any burden of evidence for your claims, and merely say the field generally supports your position. Anyone can say that for any position. I think you should drop claims of conventionality and stick to the reasoning and refutations that you propose. Noone expects references for logical statements, but claims that you have the support of most philosophers should be supported.
There aren’t any inherently, unchangeably, mental concepts.From what I can observe in your position it seems like you are treating consciousness in exactly this way. For example, could you explain how it could possibly be challenged by evidence?
I have put forward the existence of introspection as evidence for the existence of consciousness .
It is therefore logically possible for the existence of consciousness to be challenged by the non existence of introspection.
It’s not actually possible because introspection actually exists. The empirical claim that consciousness exists is supported by the empirical evidence,like any other. (Not empirical in your gerrymandered sense, of course, but empirical in the sense of not being apriori or tautologous).
The very fact of introspection indicates that consciousness, by a fairly minimal definition, is existent.
I don’t see how this follows.
As there are a whole host of definitions of consciousness, could you explicitly select a definition, and explain why you feel that introspection proves that particular definintion
Already answered: again,
Consciousness =def self awareness
Introspection =def self awareness
(not just a general sense of introspectionyness) must follow? Consciousness definitions usually imply some form of discrete mental agent, endowed with certain fairly significant properties.
Is the ability to introspect not an unusual property? Are we actually differing, apart from your higher level of vagueness?
I don’t see how that follows from “person A can’t see what person B is thinking”,
Person B can tell what person B is thinking, as well. That is important.
unless you invoke dualism. We need to understand what thought is first, and we would need a very compelling reason a physicalist would seek to derive concepts to deal with thought from disembodied thought itself
Who said anything about disembodied thought.
rather than the physical world as they observe it.Positions:1 Consciousness doesn’t exist at all.(Eliminativism) 2 Consciousness exists as a reducible physical phenomenon (physicalism) 3 Consciousness exists as an irreducible non physical phenomenal.(dualism)I’m not conflating these positions as I feel you probably think I am, merely holding that (2) is not logically consistent.
So what is the actual contradiction?
If (2) was “when we observe the brain we see a discrete phenomenon that we call consciousness”, I would say that it is more logically consistent, though I would call for a different word that isn’t historically associated with dualism.
Why a discrete phenomenon?
Is a historical association enough to make an inconsistency?
Why do you ignore introspection? Why not look down the telescope?I don’t wish to ignore it. I merely think a consistent physicalist would categorise it, like everything else, as a physical process, and therefore seek to understand and explain it using empirical evidence rather than purely mental concepts that don’t seem to exist in physical space?
I have given a detailed explanation as to why consciousness is not an inherently mental concept. You need to respond to that, and not just repeat your claim.
I finally note you refuse again to accept any burden of evidence for your claims,
False. Here is the explanation again:
“Both versions are naive. The explanatory process doesn’t start with a perfect set of concepts...reality isn’t pre-labelled. The explanatory process start with a set of “folk” or prima facie concepts, each of which may be retained, modified, or discarded as things are better understood. You cant start from nothing because you have to be able to state your explanandum, you have to state which phenomenon you are trying to explain. But having to have to a starting point does not prejudice the process forever, since the modification and abandonment options are available. For instance, the concept of phlogiston was abandoned, whereas the concept the atom was modified to no longer require indivisibility. Heat is a favourite example of a reductive explanation. The concept of heat as something to be explained was retained, but the earlier, non reductive explanation of heat as a kind of substance was abandoned. This style of explanation is what non eliminate physicalists, the type 2 position, are aiming at.”
Your engagement here is insincere. You argue based on to cherry-picking and distorting my statements. You simply ignore the explanations given and say “you haven’t given justification” and then you give off-hand vague answers for my own queries and then state “already answered”. I’m done with this.
This isn’t productive. As you’ve insisted on a long and highly critical response again, I sadly feel I need to briefly reply.
No. I merely show that the core claims of physicalism and this use of consciousness are incompatible. That’s what I’ve done. Whether some particular physicalists choose to employ some concept is a different question and a massive red herring, as I already said.
Whereas ordinary claims don’t need evidence? Could you be presenting your claims as “ordinary” to avoid the burden of evidence?
A “standard” theory of consciousness, that almost everyone believes in, including most physicalist, and presumably most dualists too? Dualists and physicalists have agreed on the nature of consciousness? I think you’ve gone waaaaay into the realms of fantasy on this one.
You have warped my position again. I didn’t argue it didn’t exist, I argued that it is a concept that is rooted in dualism. I explained why. I argued that a physicalist would be consistent if they instead used concepts drawn from empirical investigations of the brain. You seem to feel that the physical should be conceptualised based upon the mental, rather than the other way around. That position isn’t compatible with physicalism, because it implies treating the mental as categorically superior. Doing so is not an ontologically neutral position as you are presenting it.
If so then why are you treating concepts derived from pure introspection as the superior schema to categorise empirical evidence?
I did, you selectively ignored the arguments. This conversation has become largely pointless. Perhaps you feel you can achieve some goal of “winning” by merely repeating yourself and achieving “victory” by the other person losing faith in the merit of the conversation. Your basic approach seems to be (1) find some minor points that you can rephrase and attack (2) simply ignore the main points and claim over and over again the main proposition hasn’t been proven. (3) deny the need to support your own claims when asked because they are conventional or “ordinary”. As such I think it would be a mistake for me to see you as honestly engaged with my propositions here. That’s a shame, because I think you would be a very interesting person to talk to if you weren’t so eager to “win”. Good luck and goodbye.
They don’t need the re-presentation of existing evidence.
They disagree about some things, and they agree enough to be talking about the same thing. Disagreement requires commonalities , otherwise it’s just miscommumication.
I didn’t say you were eliminativist. I said you were shoehorning three categories into two categories. What is your response to that?
Both versions are naive. The explanatory process doesn’t start with a perfect set of concepts...reality isn’t pre-labelled. The explanatory process start with a set of “folk” or prima facie concepts, each of which may be retained, modified, or discarded as things are better understood. You cant start from nothing because you have to be able to state your explanandum, you have to state which phenomenon you are trying to explain. But having to have to a starting point does not prejudice the process forever, since the modification and abandonment options are available. For instance, the concept of phlogiston was abandoned, whereas the concept the atom was modified to no longer require indivisibility. Heat is a favourite example of a reductive explanation. The concept of heat as something to be explained was retained, but the earlier, non reductive explanation of heat as a kind of substance was abandoned, in favour of identifying heat with molecular motion. Since molecular motion exits, heat exists, but it doesn’t exist separately—dualistically—from everything else. This style of explanation is what non eliminative physicalists, the type 2 position, are aiming at.
Your background assumptions are wrong. There aren’t any inherently, unchangeably, mental concepts. If you can reduce something to physics, like heat, then it’s physical. You don’t know in advance what you can reduce. The different positions on the nature of consciousness are different guesses or bets on the outcome. Non eliminating physicalism, the type 2 position is bet on the outcome that consciousness will be identified with some physical process. at which point it will no longer be a “dualistic concept”.
I am not using concepts derived from introspection. The very fact of introspection indicates that consciousness, by a fairly minimal definition, is existent. Why do you ignore introspection? Why not look down the telescope?
From what I can observe in your position it seems like you are treating consciousness in exactly this way. For example, could you explain how it could possibly be challenged by evidence? How could it change or be refined if we say “introspection therefore consciousness”?
I don’t see how this follows. As there are a whole host of definitions of consciousness, could you explicitly select a definition, and explain why you feel that introspection proves that particular definintion (not just a general sense of introspectionyness) must follow? Consciousness definitions usually imply some form of discrete mental agent, endowed with certain fairly significant properties. I don’t see how that follows from “person A can’t see what person B is thinking”, unless you invoke dualism. We need to understand what thought is first, and we would need a very compelling reason a physicalist would seek to derive concepts to deal with thought from disembodied thought itself rather than the physical world as they observe it.
Positions:
I’m not conflating these positions as I feel you probably think I am, merely holding that (2) is not logically consistent. If (2) was “when we observe the brain we see a discrete phenomenon that we call consciousness”, I would say that it is more logically consistent, though I would call for a different word that isn’t historically associated with dualism.
I don’t wish to ignore it. I merely think a consistent physicalist would categorise it, like everything else, as a physical process, and therefore seek to understand and explain it using empirical evidence rather than purely mental concepts that don’t seem to exist in physical space?
I finally note you refuse again to accept any burden of evidence for your claims, and merely say the field generally supports your position. Anyone can say that for any position. I think you should drop claims of conventionality and stick to the reasoning and refutations that you propose. Noone expects references for logical statements, but claims that you have the support of most philosophers should be supported.
EDIT> Reply bait oh man
I have put forward the existence of introspection as evidence for the existence of consciousness . It is therefore logically possible for the existence of consciousness to be challenged by the non existence of introspection. It’s not actually possible because introspection actually exists. The empirical claim that consciousness exists is supported by the empirical evidence,like any other. (Not empirical in your gerrymandered sense, of course, but empirical in the sense of not being apriori or tautologous).
Already answered: again,
Consciousness =def self awareness
Introspection =def self awareness
Is the ability to introspect not an unusual property? Are we actually differing, apart from your higher level of vagueness?
Person B can tell what person B is thinking, as well. That is important.
Who said anything about disembodied thought.
So what is the actual contradiction?
Why a discrete phenomenon?
Is a historical association enough to make an inconsistency?
I have given a detailed explanation as to why consciousness is not an inherently mental concept. You need to respond to that, and not just repeat your claim.
False. Here is the explanation again:
“Both versions are naive. The explanatory process doesn’t start with a perfect set of concepts...reality isn’t pre-labelled. The explanatory process start with a set of “folk” or prima facie concepts, each of which may be retained, modified, or discarded as things are better understood. You cant start from nothing because you have to be able to state your explanandum, you have to state which phenomenon you are trying to explain. But having to have to a starting point does not prejudice the process forever, since the modification and abandonment options are available. For instance, the concept of phlogiston was abandoned, whereas the concept the atom was modified to no longer require indivisibility. Heat is a favourite example of a reductive explanation. The concept of heat as something to be explained was retained, but the earlier, non reductive explanation of heat as a kind of substance was abandoned. This style of explanation is what non eliminate physicalists, the type 2 position, are aiming at.”
Your engagement here is insincere. You argue based on to cherry-picking and distorting my statements. You simply ignore the explanations given and say “you haven’t given justification” and then you give off-hand vague answers for my own queries and then state “already answered”. I’m done with this.