The problem is this: it seems propositions, being the objects of belief, cannot in general be spatially and temporally unqualified.
Note the clause “in general.” Any assertion that applies “in general” can have exceptions in specific contexts.
We similarly cannot deduce, in general, that a coin toss which influences the path(s) of an experiment, is a 50:50 proposition when evaluated in the context of only one path.
“In the philosophy of language, an indexical is any expression whose content varies from one context of use to another.”
An awake Beauty is asked about her current assessment of the proposition “The coin will/has landed Heads.” Presumably, she is supposed to answer on the same day. So, while the content of the expression “today” may change with the changing context of the overarching experiment, that context does not change between asking and answering. So this passage is irrelevant.
The problem with indexicals is that they have meanings that may change over the course of the problem being discussed.
And the problem with using this argument on the proposition “Today is Monday,” is that neither the context, nor the meaning, changes within the problem Beauty addresses.
The above is telling us that a “proposition” involving an indexical is not a single proposition, but a set of propositions that you get by specifying a particular time/location.
No, it analyzed two specific usages of an indexical, and showed that they represented different propositions. And concluded that, in general, indexicals can represent different propositions. It never said that multiple usages of a time/location word cannot represent the same proposition, or that we can’t define a situation where we know they represent the same proposition.
If we accept this agreement, we must avoid words such as ‘I’, ‘my’, ‘now’, or ‘this’, whose meaning or reference depends on the circumstances of their use.
So my corner bar can post a sign saying “Free Beer Tomorrow,” without ever having to pour free suds. But if it says “Free Beer Today,” they will, because the context of the sign is the same as the context when somebody asks for it. Both are indexicals, but the conditions that would make it ambiguous are removed.
“words will continue to be used in the same way” They do not change meaning within the discussion.
And over the duration of when Beauty considers the meaning of “today,” it does not change.
the same word used at different points in the argument must have the same meaning.
“Today” means the same thing every time Beauty uses it. This is different than saying the truth value of the statement is the same at different points in Beauty’s argument; but it is. She is making a different (but identical) argument on the two days.
“we must avoid words such as… ‘now’, … whose meaning or reference depends on the circumstances of their use.”
Only if those circumstances might change within the scope of their use.
requires that [words] be replaced by words that we can treat as uniform in meaning or reference throughout a discussion.
And throughout Beauty’s discussion of the probability she was asked for, the meaning of “Today” does not change.
And over the duration of when Beauty considers the meaning of “today,” it does not change.
That duration potentially includes both Monday and Tuesday.
“Today” means the same thing every time Beauty uses it.
This is getting ridiculous. “Today” means a different thing on every different day. That’s why the article lists it as an indexical. Going back to the quote, the “discussion” is not limited to a single day. There are at least two days involved.
I notice you carefully ignored the quote from Epstein’s book, which was very clear that a classical proposition must not contain indexicals.
(Not in order)
Note the clause “in general.” Any assertion that applies “in general” can have exceptions in specific contexts.
We similarly cannot deduce, in general, that a coin toss which influences the path(s) of an experiment, is a 50:50 proposition when evaluated in the context of only one path.
An awake Beauty is asked about her current assessment of the proposition “The coin will/has landed Heads.” Presumably, she is supposed to answer on the same day. So, while the content of the expression “today” may change with the changing context of the overarching experiment, that context does not change between asking and answering. So this passage is irrelevant.
And the problem with using this argument on the proposition “Today is Monday,” is that neither the context, nor the meaning, changes within the problem Beauty addresses.
No, it analyzed two specific usages of an indexical, and showed that they represented different propositions. And concluded that, in general, indexicals can represent different propositions. It never said that multiple usages of a time/location word cannot represent the same proposition, or that we can’t define a situation where we know they represent the same proposition.
So my corner bar can post a sign saying “Free Beer Tomorrow,” without ever having to pour free suds. But if it says “Free Beer Today,” they will, because the context of the sign is the same as the context when somebody asks for it. Both are indexicals, but the conditions that would make it ambiguous are removed.
And over the duration of when Beauty considers the meaning of “today,” it does not change.
“Today” means the same thing every time Beauty uses it. This is different than saying the truth value of the statement is the same at different points in Beauty’s argument; but it is. She is making a different (but identical) argument on the two days.
Only if those circumstances might change within the scope of their use.
And throughout Beauty’s discussion of the probability she was asked for, the meaning of “Today” does not change.
Now you’re really stretching.
That duration potentially includes both Monday and Tuesday.
This is getting ridiculous. “Today” means a different thing on every different day. That’s why the article lists it as an indexical. Going back to the quote, the “discussion” is not limited to a single day. There are at least two days involved.
I notice you carefully ignored the quote from Epstein’s book, which was very clear that a classical proposition must not contain indexicals.