Harth’s framing was presented as an argument re: the canonical Sleeping Beauty problem.
And the question I need to answer is: “should I accept Harth’s frame?”
I am at least convinced that it is genuinely a question about how we define probability.
There is still a disconnect though.
While I agree with the frequentist answer, it’s not clear to me how to backgpropagate this in a Bayesian framework.
Suppose I treat myself as identical to all other agents in the reference class.
I know that my reference class will do better if we answer “tails” when asked about the outcome of the coin toss.
But it’s not obvious to me that there is anything to update from when trying to do a Bayesian probability calculation.
There being many more observers in the tails world to me doesn’t seem to alter these probabilities at all:
P(waking up)
P(being asked questions)
P(...)
By stipulation my observational evidence is the same in both cases.
And I am not compelled by assuming I should be randomly sampled from all observers.
There are many more versions of me in this other world does not by itself seem to raise the probability of me witnessing the observational evidence since by stipulation all versions of me witness the same evidence.
My current position now is basically: