I don’t see how nepotism effects the system too horribly. Businesses are still entirely allowed to hire close friends and family despite less credentials, and any other nepotistic behavior that’s counter to the purpose of profit.
The Watchdogs, however, can’t just hand out certification willy nilly, because they need a universal metric for all competing businesses in a field.
If Business A makes a habit of bribing Watchdog A so Mr. CEO’s sons can have the same certification as actual students (for the purpose of hiding nepotism), then Watchdog B’s nepotism free selection methods will locate higher quality employees more consistently, and garner costumers from the majority of companies that are primarily interested in actual profit.
I don’t see how nepotism effects the system too horribly. Businesses are still entirely allowed to hire close friends and family despite less credentials, and any other nepotistic behavior that’s counter to the purpose of profit.
Well, I was speaking from the perspective of someone who has actual experience in writing business credentialing systems. The effect is small enough to come out in the wash most of the time, but is important enough to require implementation (or at the very least, to prevent robustness in the implementation of goal 1.) The problem is that profit-maximization is ultimately less important than status-maintenance, in many cases—but the environment requires that profit-maximization appears to be the primary motive.
The system needs to be designed in such a way to allow covert nepotism, as businesses desire the ability to behave nepotistical without appearing to be, and this demand is important and consistent enough for the market solution to inevitably include it. And you are also saying that nepotism isn’t too harmful, and the system we’d attempt to implement should include mechanisms for nepotism.
(God I sometimes hate human behavior. ARGGH)
Is this correct? Have you communicated the correct ideas to me?
And, In what ways have business credentialing systems handled this kind of demand historically, and are similar methods applicable here?
Is this correct? Have you communicated the correct ideas to me?
From my experience, yes.
And, In what ways have business credentialing systems handled this kind of demand historically, and are similar methods applicable here?
In my experience (which is by no means exhaustive), the “recommended” solution has been to ensure that the data entry and transmission processes are performed by humans, rather than fully automated, and that no automated data integrity checks are performed.
Also in my experience, this ‘solution’ does far more harm to the system than the nepotism itself. :(
Ok. So the problem is that designing systems with accessible back-doors for nepotism is a larger hit to the effectiveness of the industry than if there were simply blatant nepotism itself, and systems weren’t compromised by third parties.
Is this correct? In your (admittedly non-exauhstive) experience, in what specific ways is the industry harmed?
Ok. So the problem is that designing systems with accessible back-doors for nepotism is a larger hit to the effectiveness of the industry than if there were simply blatant nepotism itself, and systems weren’t compromised by third parties.
Is this correct?
Yes; that’s my current thesis, anyway.
In your (admittedly non-exauhstive) experience, in what specific ways is the industry harmed?
Because nepotism is being hidden behind a cloud of general inefficiency and unaccountability, systems are designed to be inefficient and unaccountable. This means that plenty of other failure modes ride in on the same train—HR interviewing processes become a nightmare, reporting and recording instances of harassment, fraud, etc. become fraught with roadblocks and potential backlash, and internal and outreach hires based on specific recommendations / vouchsafes become a needlessly complicated process.
I don’t see how nepotism effects the system too horribly. Businesses are still entirely allowed to hire close friends and family despite less credentials, and any other nepotistic behavior that’s counter to the purpose of profit.
The Watchdogs, however, can’t just hand out certification willy nilly, because they need a universal metric for all competing businesses in a field.
If Business A makes a habit of bribing Watchdog A so Mr. CEO’s sons can have the same certification as actual students (for the purpose of hiding nepotism), then Watchdog B’s nepotism free selection methods will locate higher quality employees more consistently, and garner costumers from the majority of companies that are primarily interested in actual profit.
Well, I was speaking from the perspective of someone who has actual experience in writing business credentialing systems. The effect is small enough to come out in the wash most of the time, but is important enough to require implementation (or at the very least, to prevent robustness in the implementation of goal 1.) The problem is that profit-maximization is ultimately less important than status-maintenance, in many cases—but the environment requires that profit-maximization appears to be the primary motive.
Ok, I think I understand what your saying.
The system needs to be designed in such a way to allow covert nepotism, as businesses desire the ability to behave nepotistical without appearing to be, and this demand is important and consistent enough for the market solution to inevitably include it. And you are also saying that nepotism isn’t too harmful, and the system we’d attempt to implement should include mechanisms for nepotism.
(God I sometimes hate human behavior. ARGGH)
Is this correct? Have you communicated the correct ideas to me?
And, In what ways have business credentialing systems handled this kind of demand historically, and are similar methods applicable here?
From my experience, yes.
In my experience (which is by no means exhaustive), the “recommended” solution has been to ensure that the data entry and transmission processes are performed by humans, rather than fully automated, and that no automated data integrity checks are performed.
Also in my experience, this ‘solution’ does far more harm to the system than the nepotism itself. :(
Ok. So the problem is that designing systems with accessible back-doors for nepotism is a larger hit to the effectiveness of the industry than if there were simply blatant nepotism itself, and systems weren’t compromised by third parties.
Is this correct? In your (admittedly non-exauhstive) experience, in what specific ways is the industry harmed?
Yes; that’s my current thesis, anyway.
Because nepotism is being hidden behind a cloud of general inefficiency and unaccountability, systems are designed to be inefficient and unaccountable. This means that plenty of other failure modes ride in on the same train—HR interviewing processes become a nightmare, reporting and recording instances of harassment, fraud, etc. become fraught with roadblocks and potential backlash, and internal and outreach hires based on specific recommendations / vouchsafes become a needlessly complicated process.