“Conclusively” is doing too much work there. Do you attribute feelings or emotions to current AIs? I deny them on the same grounds as I deny them to any of the other software I use, and to rocks. I say current AIs, because that is what I had in mind, and because there would be no point in arguing “But suppose someone did make an AI with emotions! Then it would have emotions!”
I just gave my answer. For more, there’s this from my recent ding-dong with Signer. Briefly, in the absence of any method of actually detecting and measuring consciousness (a concept in which I include feelings and emotions), a consciousnessometer, we must fall back on the experiences that give rise to the very concept, on the basis of which we attribute consciousness to people besides ourselves, and to some extent other animals. On that basis I see no reason to attribute it to any extant piece of software.
Briefly, in the absence of any method of actually detecting and measuring consciousness (a concept in which I include feelings and emotions), a consciousnessometer, we must fall back on the experiences that give rise to the very concept, on the basis of which we attribute consciousness to people besides ourselves, and to some extent other animals.
That seems like a less popular understanding.
Why must consciousness include ‘feelings’ and ‘emotions’?
If someone has their portion of the brain responsible for emotional processing damaged, do they become less conscious?
Merriam-webster also lists that as number 2 in their dictionary, and a different definition in the number one position:
Definition of consciousness
1a: the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself
b: the state or fact of being conscious of an external object, state, or fact
c: AWARENESSespecially: concern for some social or political cause The organization aims to raise the political consciousness of teenagers.
2: the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought : MIND
3: the totality of conscious states of an individual
4: the normal state of conscious liferegained consciousness
5: the upper level of mental life of which the person is aware as contrasted with unconscious processes
Why must consciousness include ‘feelings’ and ‘emotions’?
If they are present, they are part of consciousness. They are included in the things of which one is aware within oneself (and in item 2 of the definition you quote). I did not intend any implication that they must be present, for consciousness to be present.
How can we know conclusively that ‘The AI itself is not feeling or emoting.’?
“Conclusively” is doing too much work there. Do you attribute feelings or emotions to current AIs? I deny them on the same grounds as I deny them to any of the other software I use, and to rocks. I say current AIs, because that is what I had in mind, and because there would be no point in arguing “But suppose someone did make an AI with emotions! Then it would have emotions!”
If the objectionable word is removed:
Would you have a different answer?
I just gave my answer. For more, there’s this from my recent ding-dong with Signer. Briefly, in the absence of any method of actually detecting and measuring consciousness (a concept in which I include feelings and emotions), a consciousnessometer, we must fall back on the experiences that give rise to the very concept, on the basis of which we attribute consciousness to people besides ourselves, and to some extent other animals. On that basis I see no reason to attribute it to any extant piece of software.
That seems like a less popular understanding.
Why must consciousness include ‘feelings’ and ‘emotions’?
If someone has their portion of the brain responsible for emotional processing damaged, do they become less conscious?
Merriam-webster also lists that as number 2 in their dictionary, and a different definition in the number one position:
If they are present, they are part of consciousness. They are included in the things of which one is aware within oneself (and in item 2 of the definition you quote). I did not intend any implication that they must be present, for consciousness to be present.