The laws are in the map, of course (if it came from mind, it is necessarily of a map). And what we call the ‘territory’ is a map itself. The map/territory distinction is just a useful analogy for explaining that our models of reality aren’t necessarily reality (whatever that actually is). Also, keep in mind that there are many incompatible meanings for ‘reductionism’. A lot of LWers (like anonymous1) use it in a way that’s not in line with EY, and EY uses it in a way that’s not in line with philosophy (which is where I suspect most LWers get their definition of it from).
And if the physical laws are in the map, what represents them in the territory?
Good question. A description is sufficient for execution, but what executes the description?
Surely territory is just another name for reality?
I think you misinterpreted me. Territory is just another name for reality, but reality is just a name and so is territory. By nature of names coming from mind, they are maps because they can’t perfectly represent whatever actually is (or more accurately, we can’t confirm our representations as perfectly representational and we possibly can’t form perfect representations). Also, by saying “actually is,” I’m creating a map, too—but I hope you infer what I mean. The methods by which we as humans receive and transform our state is imperfect and therefore uncertainty is injected into any thing we do, and furthermore by talking of “reality” (as it actually is) we assume no limitations of human-minds or general-mind-design that prevent us from forming what actually is within the constraints of our minds and general-mind-design.
Indeed, what? Is there an underlying computing substrate, which is more “real” than the territory?
Essentially, my question was a syncretization of the five ways. I.e., at the meta-level, what causes? Some people like Aquinas say that such a cause entails that it has the most important properties ascribed to their God (and consequently they pattern match “what causes” to their God). I don’t take that view, though. I just think (i.e., a hunch) there’s something there to explain and that it probably necessitates a teleological worldview at the meta-level if it is to be explained. I don’t know.
The laws are in the map, of course (if it came from mind, it is necessarily of a map). And what we call the ‘territory’ is a map itself. The map/territory distinction is just a useful analogy for explaining that our models of reality aren’t necessarily reality (whatever that actually is). Also, keep in mind that there are many incompatible meanings for ‘reductionism’. A lot of LWers (like anonymous1) use it in a way that’s not in line with EY, and EY uses it in a way that’s not in line with philosophy (which is where I suspect most LWers get their definition of it from).
Good question. A description is sufficient for execution, but what executes the description?
I read this the other day...very thought-provoking.
I think a realist would take issue with this statement… Surely territory is just another name for reality?
Indeed, what? Is there an underlying computing substrate, which is more “real” than the territory?
I think you misinterpreted me. Territory is just another name for reality, but reality is just a name and so is territory. By nature of names coming from mind, they are maps because they can’t perfectly represent whatever actually is (or more accurately, we can’t confirm our representations as perfectly representational and we possibly can’t form perfect representations). Also, by saying “actually is,” I’m creating a map, too—but I hope you infer what I mean. The methods by which we as humans receive and transform our state is imperfect and therefore uncertainty is injected into any thing we do, and furthermore by talking of “reality” (as it actually is) we assume no limitations of human-minds or general-mind-design that prevent us from forming what actually is within the constraints of our minds and general-mind-design.
Essentially, my question was a syncretization of the five ways. I.e., at the meta-level, what causes? Some people like Aquinas say that such a cause entails that it has the most important properties ascribed to their God (and consequently they pattern match “what causes” to their God). I don’t take that view, though. I just think (i.e., a hunch) there’s something there to explain and that it probably necessitates a teleological worldview at the meta-level if it is to be explained. I don’t know.