Thanks for your comment. §1 : Okay, you mean something like this, right? I think you’re right, maybe the game of life wasn’t the best example then.
§2 : I think I agree, but I can’t really get why would one need to know which configuration gave rise to our universe.
§ 3 : I’m not sure if i’m answering adequately, but I meant many chaotic phenomena, which probably include stars transforming into supernovae. In that case we arguably can’t precisely predict the time of the transformation without fully computing “low level phenomena”. But still I can’t see why we would need to “distinguish our world from others”.
For now I’m not sure to see where you’re going after that, i’m sorry ! Maybe i’ll think about it again and get it later.
I can’t really get why would one need to know which configuration gave rise to our universe.
This was with respect to feasibility of locating our specific universe for simulation at full fidelity. It’s unclear if it’s feasible, but if it were, that could entail a way to get at an entire future state of our universe.
I can’t see why we would need to “distinguish our world from others”
This was only a point about useful macroscopic predictions any significant distance in the future; prediction relies on information which distinguishes which world we’re in.
For now I’m not sure to see where you’re going after that, i’m sorry ! Maybe i’ll think about it again and get it later.
I wouldn’t worry about that, I was mostly adding some relevant details rather than necessarily arguing against your points. The point about game of life was suggesting that it permits compression, which for me makes it harder to determine if it demonstrates the same sort of reducibility that quantum states might importantly have (or whatever the lowest level is which still has important degrees of freedom wrt prediction). The only accounts of this I’ve encountered suggest there is some important irreducibility in QM, but I’m not yet convinced there isn’t a suitable form of compression at some level for the purpose of AC.
Both macroscopic prediction and AC seem to depend on the feasibility of ‘flattening up’ from quantum states sufficiently cheaply that a pre-computed structure can support accurate macroscopic prediction or AC—if it is feasible, it stands to reason that it would allow capture to be cheap.
There is also an argument I didn’t go into which suggests that observers might typically find themselves in places that are hard / infeasible to capture for intentional reasons: a certain sort of simulator might be said to fully own anything it doesn’t have to share control of, which is suggestive of those states being higher value. This is a point in favor of irreducibility as a potential sim-blocker for simulators after the first if it’s targetable in the first place. For example, it might be possible to condition the small states a simulator is working with on large-state phenomena as a cryptographic sim-blocker. This then feeds into considerations about acausal trade among agents which do or do not use cryptographic sim-blockers due to feasibility.
I don’t know of anything working against the conclusion you’re entertaining, the overall argument is good. I expect an argument from QM and computational complexity could inform my uncertainty about whether the compression permitted in QM entails feasibility of computing states faster than physics.
Thanks for your comment. §1 : Okay, you mean something like this, right? I think you’re right, maybe the game of life wasn’t the best example then.
§2 : I think I agree, but I can’t really get why would one need to know which configuration gave rise to our universe.
§ 3 : I’m not sure if i’m answering adequately, but I meant many chaotic phenomena, which probably include stars transforming into supernovae. In that case we arguably can’t precisely predict the time of the transformation without fully computing “low level phenomena”. But still I can’t see why we would need to “distinguish our world from others”.
For now I’m not sure to see where you’re going after that, i’m sorry ! Maybe i’ll think about it again and get it later.
This was with respect to feasibility of locating our specific universe for simulation at full fidelity. It’s unclear if it’s feasible, but if it were, that could entail a way to get at an entire future state of our universe.
This was only a point about useful macroscopic predictions any significant distance in the future; prediction relies on information which distinguishes which world we’re in.
I wouldn’t worry about that, I was mostly adding some relevant details rather than necessarily arguing against your points. The point about game of life was suggesting that it permits compression, which for me makes it harder to determine if it demonstrates the same sort of reducibility that quantum states might importantly have (or whatever the lowest level is which still has important degrees of freedom wrt prediction). The only accounts of this I’ve encountered suggest there is some important irreducibility in QM, but I’m not yet convinced there isn’t a suitable form of compression at some level for the purpose of AC.
Both macroscopic prediction and AC seem to depend on the feasibility of ‘flattening up’ from quantum states sufficiently cheaply that a pre-computed structure can support accurate macroscopic prediction or AC—if it is feasible, it stands to reason that it would allow capture to be cheap.
There is also an argument I didn’t go into which suggests that observers might typically find themselves in places that are hard / infeasible to capture for intentional reasons: a certain sort of simulator might be said to fully own anything it doesn’t have to share control of, which is suggestive of those states being higher value. This is a point in favor of irreducibility as a potential sim-blocker for simulators after the first if it’s targetable in the first place. For example, it might be possible to condition the small states a simulator is working with on large-state phenomena as a cryptographic sim-blocker. This then feeds into considerations about acausal trade among agents which do or do not use cryptographic sim-blockers due to feasibility.
I don’t know of anything working against the conclusion you’re entertaining, the overall argument is good. I expect an argument from QM and computational complexity could inform my uncertainty about whether the compression permitted in QM entails feasibility of computing states faster than physics.