I think a simpler way to state the objection is to say that “value” and “meaning” are transitive verbs. I can value money; Steve can value cars; Mike can value himself. It’s not clear what it would even mean for objective reality to value something. Similarly, a subject may “mean” a referent to an interpreter, but nothing can just “mean” or even “mean something” without an implicit interpreter, and “objective reality” doesn’t seem to be the sort of thing that can interpret.
I guess you could posit natural selection as being objective reality’s value system, but I have the feeling that’s not the kind of thing moral realists have in mind.
Indeed. A certain coronavirus has recently achieved remarkable gains in Darwinist terms, but this is not generally considered a moral triumph. Quite the opposite, as a dislike for disease is a near-universal human value.
It is often tempting to use near-universal human values as a substitute for objective values, and sometimes it works. However, such values are not always internally consistent because humanity isn’t. Values such as disease prevention came into conflict with other values such as prosperity during the pandemic, with some people supporting strict lockdowns and others supporting a return to business as usual.
And there are words such as “justice” which refer to ostensibly near-universal human values except people don’t always agree on what that value is or what it demands in any specific case.
I think a simpler way to state the objection is to say that “value” and “meaning” are transitive verbs. I can value money; Steve can value cars; Mike can value himself. It’s not clear what it would even mean for objective reality to value something. Similarly, a subject may “mean” a referent to an interpreter, but nothing can just “mean” or even “mean something” without an implicit interpreter, and “objective reality” doesn’t seem to be the sort of thing that can interpret.
I guess you could posit natural selection as being objective reality’s value system, but I have the feeling that’s not the kind of thing moral realists have in mind.
Indeed. A certain coronavirus has recently achieved remarkable gains in Darwinist terms, but this is not generally considered a moral triumph. Quite the opposite, as a dislike for disease is a near-universal human value.
It is often tempting to use near-universal human values as a substitute for objective values, and sometimes it works. However, such values are not always internally consistent because humanity isn’t. Values such as disease prevention came into conflict with other values such as prosperity during the pandemic, with some people supporting strict lockdowns and others supporting a return to business as usual.
And there are words such as “justice” which refer to ostensibly near-universal human values except people don’t always agree on what that value is or what it demands in any specific case.