I think this is the reason that some rationalists seem to find consciousness so disturbing; objective consequences are THE way to determine if something “exists,” except in the case of consciousness, and in that special case, the probability of it actually existing, at least for one person (namely, me) is 1.
I’ve been reading through these discussions on consciousness, and I’ve taken the time to read Richard’s external blogs on the subject, and I still have not found a single concrete reason why I should expect “consciousness” to be a special case.
It really, truly does sound an awful lot like phlogiston. It seems to me that the idea has been backing into a corner for the last few decades, as more and more is understood about the brain and how it works, there seems to be less and less room for this ephemeral idea of consciousness.
Eliezer & Co. certainly could be wrong about consciousness, and Richard & Co. could be right, but Eliezer’s position seems to me to be the far more defensible and realistic position.
The idea of a consciousness that is not tied to the physical is certainly romantic. Unfortunately, the universe as I understand it does not leave much room for such an idea, and the space in which it may be found continues to shrink. It has already gotten to the point where Richard can only argue for a concept of consciousness that seems entirely pointless, so why bother with it at all?
I think this is the reason that some rationalists seem to find consciousness so disturbing; objective consequences are THE way to determine if something “exists,” except in the case of consciousness, and in that special case, the probability of it actually existing, at least for one person (namely, me) is 1.
Why is consciousness a special case?
I’ve been reading through these discussions on consciousness, and I’ve taken the time to read Richard’s external blogs on the subject, and I still have not found a single concrete reason why I should expect “consciousness” to be a special case.
It really, truly does sound an awful lot like phlogiston. It seems to me that the idea has been backing into a corner for the last few decades, as more and more is understood about the brain and how it works, there seems to be less and less room for this ephemeral idea of consciousness.
Eliezer & Co. certainly could be wrong about consciousness, and Richard & Co. could be right, but Eliezer’s position seems to me to be the far more defensible and realistic position.
The idea of a consciousness that is not tied to the physical is certainly romantic. Unfortunately, the universe as I understand it does not leave much room for such an idea, and the space in which it may be found continues to shrink. It has already gotten to the point where Richard can only argue for a concept of consciousness that seems entirely pointless, so why bother with it at all?