I agree with Said that truth (or precision of model, for untestable positions) is likely to be an important upstream causal factor if you’re talking about correlation with IQ or education. Other correlates may have other causes.
Do you have a metric for conventionality or contrarian-ness of an idea in a population? How do you decide whether “credit is risky; prefer cash” is the normal position or the rebel? This metric could be useful on it’s own—seeing how different groups accept or reject various hypotheses could be a fascinating study.
The problem is that I can’t possibly have the expertise to discern which of the contrarian positions are true, and if I were to try to independently arrive at my own conclusions, I would invariably end up deferring to experts and authorities on the subject, which would, in most cases, be the non-contrarian position. My current simple method for operationalizing contrariness is simply looking at how popular a given belief is, across the relevant social groups you ascribe to.
I agree with Said that truth (or precision of model, for untestable positions) is likely to be an important upstream causal factor if you’re talking about correlation with IQ or education. Other correlates may have other causes.
Do you have a metric for conventionality or contrarian-ness of an idea in a population? How do you decide whether “credit is risky; prefer cash” is the normal position or the rebel? This metric could be useful on it’s own—seeing how different groups accept or reject various hypotheses could be a fascinating study.
The problem is that I can’t possibly have the expertise to discern which of the contrarian positions are true, and if I were to try to independently arrive at my own conclusions, I would invariably end up deferring to experts and authorities on the subject, which would, in most cases, be the non-contrarian position. My current simple method for operationalizing contrariness is simply looking at how popular a given belief is, across the relevant social groups you ascribe to.