Comparing Bayesian theory with frequentism is like comparing general relativity with Newton’s theory. Both explain reality, and it is even easier to explain Newton’s theory to children, although the general relativity is more true.
Most people intuitively learn frequentism, but some learn Bayesian methods for cases that they constantly encounter and in which frequency methods are not accurate enough.
But, in any case, frequency methods are built on Bayesian one way or another. An ordinary person, observing the Bayesian world, comes up with a simplified version of it—frequency methods. Newton, observing the world of general relativity, comes up with his own theory, where gravity is a force.
Newtonian gravity is a limiting case of GR (specifically in the low velocity and weak gravity case), which means GR is a strict superset of Newtonian gravity. But it’s not accurate to think of frequentism as a limiting case of Bayesian theory. They have two completely different philosophies, and both require assumptions that are sometimes incompatible with each other. The obvious example is the frequentist critique that the choice of prior is arbitrary (ie there being no true uninformative prior).
I also don’t think you can assert that the world is inherently Bayesian, given that statistical frameworks exist to interpret the world which has inherent uncertainties. It doesn’t make sense to say that there is one true statistical framework under which probabilistic events occur.
I don’t see the difference. The theory of relativity and Newton’s theory also have different philosophies: Newton’s theory states that gravity is a force, that the universe is constant and eternal, etc.
Newton’s theory is not exactly a special case of the theory of relativity, because it is less accurate.
Comparing Bayesian theory with frequentism is like comparing general relativity with Newton’s theory. Both explain reality, and it is even easier to explain Newton’s theory to children, although the general relativity is more true.
Most people intuitively learn frequentism, but some learn Bayesian methods for cases that they constantly encounter and in which frequency methods are not accurate enough.
But, in any case, frequency methods are built on Bayesian one way or another. An ordinary person, observing the Bayesian world, comes up with a simplified version of it—frequency methods. Newton, observing the world of general relativity, comes up with his own theory, where gravity is a force.
Newtonian gravity is a limiting case of GR (specifically in the low velocity and weak gravity case), which means GR is a strict superset of Newtonian gravity. But it’s not accurate to think of frequentism as a limiting case of Bayesian theory. They have two completely different philosophies, and both require assumptions that are sometimes incompatible with each other. The obvious example is the frequentist critique that the choice of prior is arbitrary (ie there being no true uninformative prior).
I also don’t think you can assert that the world is inherently Bayesian, given that statistical frameworks exist to interpret the world which has inherent uncertainties. It doesn’t make sense to say that there is one true statistical framework under which probabilistic events occur.
I don’t see the difference. The theory of relativity and Newton’s theory also have different philosophies: Newton’s theory states that gravity is a force, that the universe is constant and eternal, etc.
Newton’s theory is not exactly a special case of the theory of relativity, because it is less accurate.