One common way to think about utilitarianism is to say that each person has a utility function and whatever utilitarian theory you subscribe to somehow aggregates these utility functions. My question, more-or-less, is whether an aggregating function exists that says that (assuming no impact on other sentient beings) the birth of a sentient being is neutral. My other question is whether such a function exists where the birth of the being in question is neutral if and only if that sentient being would have positive utility.
If you try to do that, you get a paradox where, if A is not creating anyone, B is creating a new person and letting them lead a sad life, and C is creating a new person and letting them lead a happy life, then U(A) = U(B) < U(C) = U(A). You can’t say that it’s better for someone to be happy than sad, but both are equivalent to nonexistence.
One common way to think about utilitarianism is to say that each person has a utility function and whatever utilitarian theory you subscribe to somehow aggregates these utility functions. My question, more-or-less, is whether an aggregating function exists that says that (assuming no impact on other sentient beings) the birth of a sentient being is neutral. My other question is whether such a function exists where the birth of the being in question is neutral if and only if that sentient being would have positive utility.
EDIT: I do recall that a similar-seeming post: http://lesswrong.com/lw/l53/introducing_corrigibility_an_fai_research_subfield/
If you try to do that, you get a paradox where, if A is not creating anyone, B is creating a new person and letting them lead a sad life, and C is creating a new person and letting them lead a happy life, then U(A) = U(B) < U(C) = U(A). You can’t say that it’s better for someone to be happy than sad, but both are equivalent to nonexistence.
Interesting. Do you have any idea why this results in a paradox, but not the corrigibility problem in general?