However, I posit that most of us intuitively use virtue ethics, and not deontology or consequentialism. In other words, when judging one’s actions we intuitively value the person’s motivations over the rules they follow or the consequences of said actions.
Consequentialism has nothing to do with how to judge someone else’s actions. If I am trying to poison my friend, but by some miracle the poison doesn’t kill him and instead manages to cure his arthritis, then I am still a bad person. Virtue ethics seems like a rational framework to judge other people by, perhaps tautologically.
If I am trying to poison my friend, but by some miracle the poison doesn’t kill him and instead manages to cure his arthritis, then I am still a bad person.
I don’t think that is quite what consequentialism means, except in the ideal case of unlimited computing power and perfect prediction capabilities. What matters in bounded consequentialism is expected consequences of someone’s actions, calculated to the best of one’s abilities, which may differ from the actual consequences. Of course, in the real world people usually get judged on the mix of intended and actual consequences.
Consequentialism has nothing to do with how to judge someone else’s actions. If I am trying to poison my friend, but by some miracle the poison doesn’t kill him and instead manages to cure his arthritis, then I am still a bad person. Virtue ethics seems like a rational framework to judge other people by, perhaps tautologically.
I don’t think that is quite what consequentialism means, except in the ideal case of unlimited computing power and perfect prediction capabilities. What matters in bounded consequentialism is expected consequences of someone’s actions, calculated to the best of one’s abilities, which may differ from the actual consequences. Of course, in the real world people usually get judged on the mix of intended and actual consequences.