You seem to be inventing a guarantee that I don’t need. If human algorithms for sensory processing are copied in full, the new beings will also have most of their thoughts about experience caused by experience. Which is good enough.
Mentioning something is not a prerequisite for having it.
If human algorithms for sensory processing are copied in full, the new beings will also have most of their thoughts about experience caused by experience
That reads like a non sequitur to me. We don’t know what the relationship between algorithms and experience is.
Mentioning something is not a prerequisite for having it.
It’s possible for a description that doesn’t explicitly mention X to nonethless add up to X, but only possible..you seem to be treating it as a necessity.
I’m convinced by Kurzweil-style (I think he originated them, not sure) neural replacement arguments that experience depends only on algorithms, not (e.g.) the particular type of matter in the brain. Maybe I shouldn’t be. But this sub-thread started when oge asked me to explain what the implications of my view are. If you want to broaden the subject and criticize (say) Chalmers’s Absent Qualia argument, I’m eager to hear it.
If you mean this sort of thing http://www.kurzweilai.net/slate-this-is-your-brain-on-neural-implants, then he is barely arguing the point at all...this is miles below philosophy-grade thinking..he doesn’t even set out a theory of selfhood, just appeals to intuitions. Absent Qualia is much better, although still not anything that should be called a proof.
I got started by Sharvy, It aint the meat its the motion, but my understanding was Kurzweil had something similar first. Maybe not. Just trying to give the devil his due.
You seem to be inventing a guarantee that I don’t need. If human algorithms for sensory processing are copied in full, the new beings will also have most of their thoughts about experience caused by experience. Which is good enough.
Mentioning something is not a prerequisite for having it.
That reads like a non sequitur to me. We don’t know what the relationship between algorithms and experience is.
It’s possible for a description that doesn’t explicitly mention X to nonethless add up to X, but only possible..you seem to be treating it as a necessity.
I’m convinced by Kurzweil-style (I think he originated them, not sure) neural replacement arguments that experience depends only on algorithms, not (e.g.) the particular type of matter in the brain. Maybe I shouldn’t be. But this sub-thread started when oge asked me to explain what the implications of my view are. If you want to broaden the subject and criticize (say) Chalmers’s Absent Qualia argument, I’m eager to hear it.
If you mean this sort of thing http://www.kurzweilai.net/slate-this-is-your-brain-on-neural-implants, then he is barely arguing the point at all...this is miles below philosophy-grade thinking..he doesn’t even set out a theory of selfhood, just appeals to intuitions. Absent Qualia is much better, although still not anything that should be called a proof.
I got started by Sharvy, It aint the meat its the motion, but my understanding was Kurzweil had something similar first. Maybe not. Just trying to give the devil his due.