I am not sure that we’re communicating meaningfully here. I said that there’s a place to set a threshold that weighs the expense against the lives. All that is required for this to be true is that we assign value to both money and lives. Where the threshold is depends on how much we value each, and obviously this will be different across situations, times, and cultures.
You’re conflating a practical concern (which behaviors should society condemn?) and an ethical concern (how do we decide the relative value of money and lives?) which isn’t even a particularly interesting ethical concern (governments have standard figures for the value of a human life; they’d need to have such to conduct any interventions at all.) And I am less certain than I was at the start of this conversation of what sort of answer you are even interested in.
I said that there’s a place to set a threshold that weighs the expense against the lives.
Do you mean one, common threshold or do you mean an individual threshold that might be different for each person? I read you as arguing for one common threshold—if we are taking about individual thresholds then I don’t see any issues—everyone just sets them wherever they like and that’s it.
You’re conflating a practical concern (which behaviors should society condemn?)
I don’t believe I said anything about what society should condemn.
what sort of answer you are even interested in
My interest started with this, as my post noted, and it mostly focuses on determing the morality of the action solely on the basis of mental states, past and present.
I don’t believe I said anything about what society should condemn.
Well, your arguments only make sense if that is how your interpreting amoral.
My interest started with this, as my post noted, and it mostly focuses on determing the morality of the action solely on the basis of mental states, past and present.
KPier’s whole argument is that the morality of the action depends on the objective conditions of the ship and the objective evidence available to the owner. The owner’s mental processes are moral (or amoral) to the extend they cause his beliefs to aline (or fail to aline) with reality.
As far as guilt, do you think Marx’s ghost should feel guilty about the results of his philosophy, or should he just say “well I tried to improve the world”?
Well, your arguments only make sense if that is how your interpreting amoral.
That sounds strange to me, can you expand on that?
KPier’s whole argument is that the morality of the action depends on the objective conditions of the ship and the objective evidence available to the owner.
So then he disagrees with W.J.Clifford, doesn’t he? The Clifford quote is all about subjective.
That sounds strange to me, can you expand on that?
You’re objections amount the the claim that “being able to be evaluated by outside observers” should be a property of morality. This is a necessary property of theory of what society should condemn, it is less clear why it’s a necessary property of morality.
So then he disagrees with W.J.Clifford, doesn’t he? The Clifford quote is all about subjective.
And the reason the owner’s mental process is immoral is because it leads the owner to evaluate the evidence incorrectly.
You’re objections amount the the claim that “being able to be evaluated by outside observers” should be a property of morality.
Um, no, I don’t think so. I don’t think I’m making any claims about properties of morality. Mostly, I’m just poking KPier’s/Clifford’s position to check for coherence.
because it leads the owner to evaluate the evidence incorrectly.
As I posted before I don’t find any objective evidence in that quote besides the two observations that the ship was old and ship sank.
I am not sure that we’re communicating meaningfully here. I said that there’s a place to set a threshold that weighs the expense against the lives. All that is required for this to be true is that we assign value to both money and lives. Where the threshold is depends on how much we value each, and obviously this will be different across situations, times, and cultures.
You’re conflating a practical concern (which behaviors should society condemn?) and an ethical concern (how do we decide the relative value of money and lives?) which isn’t even a particularly interesting ethical concern (governments have standard figures for the value of a human life; they’d need to have such to conduct any interventions at all.) And I am less certain than I was at the start of this conversation of what sort of answer you are even interested in.
Do you mean one, common threshold or do you mean an individual threshold that might be different for each person? I read you as arguing for one common threshold—if we are taking about individual thresholds then I don’t see any issues—everyone just sets them wherever they like and that’s it.
I don’t believe I said anything about what society should condemn.
My interest started with this, as my post noted, and it mostly focuses on determing the morality of the action solely on the basis of mental states, past and present.
Well, your arguments only make sense if that is how your interpreting amoral.
KPier’s whole argument is that the morality of the action depends on the objective conditions of the ship and the objective evidence available to the owner. The owner’s mental processes are moral (or amoral) to the extend they cause his beliefs to aline (or fail to aline) with reality.
As far as guilt, do you think Marx’s ghost should feel guilty about the results of his philosophy, or should he just say “well I tried to improve the world”?
That sounds strange to me, can you expand on that?
So then he disagrees with W.J.Clifford, doesn’t he? The Clifford quote is all about subjective.
You’re objections amount the the claim that “being able to be evaluated by outside observers” should be a property of morality. This is a necessary property of theory of what society should condemn, it is less clear why it’s a necessary property of morality.
And the reason the owner’s mental process is immoral is because it leads the owner to evaluate the evidence incorrectly.
Um, no, I don’t think so. I don’t think I’m making any claims about properties of morality. Mostly, I’m just poking KPier’s/Clifford’s position to check for coherence.
As I posted before I don’t find any objective evidence in that quote besides the two observations that the ship was old and ship sank.