Yeah, “3 parties with cyclic preferences” is like the aqua regia of voting systems. Unfortunately I think it means you have to replace the easy question of “is it strategy-proof” with a hard question like “on some reasonable distribution of preferences, how much strategy does it encourage?”
Yep. And I’m seeing how many of the traditional election assumptions I need to break in order to make it work.
I got independence of irrelevant alternatives by ditching determinism and using utility scales not orderings. (If a candidate has no chance of winning, their presence doesn’t effect the election)
What if those preferences were expressed on a monetary scale and the election could also move money between voters in complicated ways?
Yeah, “3 parties with cyclic preferences” is like the aqua regia of voting systems. Unfortunately I think it means you have to replace the easy question of “is it strategy-proof” with a hard question like “on some reasonable distribution of preferences, how much strategy does it encourage?”
Yep. And I’m seeing how many of the traditional election assumptions I need to break in order to make it work.
I got independence of irrelevant alternatives by ditching determinism and using utility scales not orderings. (If a candidate has no chance of winning, their presence doesn’t effect the election)
What if those preferences were expressed on a monetary scale and the election could also move money between voters in complicated ways?