In almost all applications, researchers assume that the agent (she) behaves according to one psychologically based model, while the principal (he) is fully rational and has a classical goal (usually profit maximization).
Optimal Delegation and Limited Awareness is relevant insofar as you consider an agent knowing more facts about the world is akin to them being more capable. Papers which consider contracting scenarios with bounded rationality, though not exactly principal-agent problems include Cognition and Incomplete Contracts and Satisfying Contracts. There are also some papers where the principal and agent have heterogenous priors, but the agent typically has the false prior. I’ve talked to a few economists about this, and they weren’t able to suggest anything I hadn’t seen (I don’t think my literature review is totally thorough, though).
I’ve also found it hard to find relevant papers.
Behavioural Contract Theory reviews papers based on psychology findings and notes:
Optimal Delegation and Limited Awareness is relevant insofar as you consider an agent knowing more facts about the world is akin to them being more capable. Papers which consider contracting scenarios with bounded rationality, though not exactly principal-agent problems include Cognition and Incomplete Contracts and Satisfying Contracts. There are also some papers where the principal and agent have heterogenous priors, but the agent typically has the false prior. I’ve talked to a few economists about this, and they weren’t able to suggest anything I hadn’t seen (I don’t think my literature review is totally thorough, though).