I think normal priors on moral beliefs come from a combination of:
Moral intuitions
Reasons for belief that upon reflection, we would accept as valid (e.g. desire for parsimony with other high-level moral intuitions, empirical discoveries like “vaccines reduce disease prevalence”)
Reasons for belief that upon reflection, we would not accept as valid (e.g. selfish desires, societal norms that upon reflection we would consider arbitrary, shying away from the dark world)
I think the “Disney test” is useful in that it seems like it depends much more on moral intuitions than on reasons for belief. In carrying out this test, the algorithm you would follow is (i) pick a prior based on the movie heuristic, (ii) recall all consciously held reasons for belief that seem valid, (iii) update your belief in the direction of those reasons from the heuristic-derived prior. So in cases where our belief could be biased by (possibly unconscious) reasons for belief that upon reflection we would not accept as valid, where the movie heuristic isn’t picking up many of these reasons, I’d expect this algorithm to be useful.
In the case of vaccinations, the algorithm makes the correct prediction: the prior-setting heuristic would give you a strong prior that vaccinations are immoral, but I think the valid reasons for belief are strong enough that the prior is easily overwhelmed.
I can come up with a few cases where the heuristic points me towards other possible moral beliefs I wouldn’t have otherwise considered, whose plausibility I’ve come to think is undervalued upon reflection. Here’s a case where I think the algorithm might fail: wealth redistribution. There’s a natural bias towards not wanting strong redistributive policies if you’re wealthy, and an empirical case in favor of redistribution within a first-world country with some form of social safety net doesn’t seem nearly as clear-cut to me as vaccines. My moral intuition is that hoarding wealth is still bad, but I think the heuristic might point the other way (it’s easy to make a film about royalty with lots of servants, although there are some examples like Robin Hood in the other direction).
Also, your comments have made me think a lot more about what I was hoping to get out of the heuristic in the first place and about possible improvements; thanks for that! :-)
I think normal priors on moral beliefs come from a combination of:
Moral intuitions
Reasons for belief that upon reflection, we would accept as valid (e.g. desire for parsimony with other high-level moral intuitions, empirical discoveries like “vaccines reduce disease prevalence”)
Reasons for belief that upon reflection, we would not accept as valid (e.g. selfish desires, societal norms that upon reflection we would consider arbitrary, shying away from the dark world)
I think the “Disney test” is useful in that it seems like it depends much more on moral intuitions than on reasons for belief. In carrying out this test, the algorithm you would follow is (i) pick a prior based on the movie heuristic, (ii) recall all consciously held reasons for belief that seem valid, (iii) update your belief in the direction of those reasons from the heuristic-derived prior. So in cases where our belief could be biased by (possibly unconscious) reasons for belief that upon reflection we would not accept as valid, where the movie heuristic isn’t picking up many of these reasons, I’d expect this algorithm to be useful.
In the case of vaccinations, the algorithm makes the correct prediction: the prior-setting heuristic would give you a strong prior that vaccinations are immoral, but I think the valid reasons for belief are strong enough that the prior is easily overwhelmed.
I can come up with a few cases where the heuristic points me towards other possible moral beliefs I wouldn’t have otherwise considered, whose plausibility I’ve come to think is undervalued upon reflection. Here’s a case where I think the algorithm might fail: wealth redistribution. There’s a natural bias towards not wanting strong redistributive policies if you’re wealthy, and an empirical case in favor of redistribution within a first-world country with some form of social safety net doesn’t seem nearly as clear-cut to me as vaccines. My moral intuition is that hoarding wealth is still bad, but I think the heuristic might point the other way (it’s easy to make a film about royalty with lots of servants, although there are some examples like Robin Hood in the other direction).
Also, your comments have made me think a lot more about what I was hoping to get out of the heuristic in the first place and about possible improvements; thanks for that! :-)