My mechanism is designed to operate without payments (in contrast to the original BTS). Since no payments are being made and no score is necessarily being tracked, the incentive to participate is the same in a typical poll: to influence the outcome. Recruiting people to vote with you helps your side, same as in a regular poll, but that won’t make anyone else want to switch their vote. A public announcement about a committed voting bloc affects the predictions of both sides equally. A manipulator should persuade everyone else he is on their side, which helps his bloc and hurts everyone else.
With Prelec’s BTS, you should falsely announce the other side has lots of support so people will predict it is popular, but it ends up looking lackluster.
I’m confused about what you are addressing.
My mechanism is designed to operate without payments (in contrast to the original BTS). Since no payments are being made and no score is necessarily being tracked, the incentive to participate is the same in a typical poll: to influence the outcome. Recruiting people to vote with you helps your side, same as in a regular poll, but that won’t make anyone else want to switch their vote. A public announcement about a committed voting bloc affects the predictions of both sides equally. A manipulator should persuade everyone else he is on their side, which helps his bloc and hurts everyone else.
With Prelec’s BTS, you should falsely announce the other side has lots of support so people will predict it is popular, but it ends up looking lackluster.