Hi, I’m new here but I’ve been following the sequences in the suggested order up to this point.
I have no problem with the main idea of this article. I say this only so that everyone knows that I’m nitpicking. If you’re not interested in nitpicking then just ignore this post.
I don’t think that the example given bellow is a very good one to demonstrate the concept of Conservation of Expected Evidence:
If you argue that God, to test humanity’s faith, refuses to reveal His existence, then the miracles described in the Bible >must argue against the existence of God.
Assuming I’m reading this correctly:
Our Prior is P(G) = The probability that God Exists (let’s assume this is the Judeo-Christain God since that seems to be the intended target)
P(T) = the probability that God is Testing Humanity by not revealing his existence
P(M) = the probability that the Miracles of the bible are true.
The issue that I find with this is that P(G|T) = 1
If God is testing Humanity by hiding his existence there is a 100% chance that God Exists. I was going to write out the whole Bayesian equation to explain why this is true, but I think it’s pretty intuitive. P(T) cannot be evidence for P(G) since it assumes that P(G) is true.
Another issue is that the way this is written you’re implying that P(M) = P(~T). But this is not true, since the Miracles of the bible existing is not the direct opposite of God testing humanity by not reveling his existence. Unless you intend to completely twist the argument that most people are making when they say assert P(T) as truth. They aren’t saying or even implying that God wants there to be no evidence at all of his existence. Most theist would instead argue that the existence of miracles are a part of God’s test for humanity. They say that God sent us miraculous signs and prophets instead of just coming down and saying “Hey humanity, I’m God” because he wanted to test our faith. Had they the mathematical language, they would say that P(T|M) > P(T), meaning M serves as evidence of T. Not P(M) = P(~T)
Though this whole concept of God “testing humanity by not revealing himself” does seem more like an example of Belief in belief, where P(T) was devised as a means to justify the existence of an invisible God, I still feel like the example you’ve given is a bit of a stretch.
I would say, rather, that: G = God exists N = The existence of God is not revealed directly to humanity M = Miracles occur ...and we’re talking about P(G|N) and P(G|M) and not talking about P(T) at all.
More generally, T seems to be a red herring here.
That said, I agree that there’s a presumption that M implies ~N… that is, that if miracles occurred, that would constitute the direct revelation of God’s existence.
And yes, one could argue instead that no, miracles aren’t a revelation of God’s existence at all, but rather a test of faith. A lot depends here on what counts as a miracle; further discussion along this line would benefit from specificity.
Your N seems more likely what the author intended, now that you point it out.
Though I still don’t think anyone who thought about it for more than 20 seconds would ever assert that N could be used as evidence for G.
But using that as a model would probably serve well to underscore the point of Conservation of Evidence
If the fact that God has not been revealed directly to humanity is evidence for the existence of God. Then should God ever reveal himself directly to humanity, it would be evidence against his existence.
That’s probably the statement Eliezer intended to make.
And I would not be in the least surprised to find theologians arguing that the absence of direct evidence of God’s existence is itself proof of the existence of God, and I would be somewhat surprised to find that none ever had, but I don’t have examples.
That said, straw theism is not particularly uncommon on LW; when people want a go-to example of invalid reasoning, belief in god comes readily to hand. It derives from a common cultural presumption of atheism, although there are some theists around.
Hi, I’m new here but I’ve been following the sequences in the suggested order up to this point.
I have no problem with the main idea of this article. I say this only so that everyone knows that I’m nitpicking. If you’re not interested in nitpicking then just ignore this post.
I don’t think that the example given bellow is a very good one to demonstrate the concept of Conservation of Expected Evidence:
Assuming I’m reading this correctly:
Our Prior is P(G) = The probability that God Exists (let’s assume this is the Judeo-Christain God since that seems to be the intended target)
P(T) = the probability that God is Testing Humanity by not revealing his existence
P(M) = the probability that the Miracles of the bible are true.
The issue that I find with this is that P(G|T) = 1
If God is testing Humanity by hiding his existence there is a 100% chance that God Exists. I was going to write out the whole Bayesian equation to explain why this is true, but I think it’s pretty intuitive. P(T) cannot be evidence for P(G) since it assumes that P(G) is true.
Another issue is that the way this is written you’re implying that P(M) = P(~T). But this is not true, since the Miracles of the bible existing is not the direct opposite of God testing humanity by not reveling his existence. Unless you intend to completely twist the argument that most people are making when they say assert P(T) as truth. They aren’t saying or even implying that God wants there to be no evidence at all of his existence. Most theist would instead argue that the existence of miracles are a part of God’s test for humanity. They say that God sent us miraculous signs and prophets instead of just coming down and saying “Hey humanity, I’m God” because he wanted to test our faith. Had they the mathematical language, they would say that P(T|M) > P(T), meaning M serves as evidence of T. Not P(M) = P(~T)
Though this whole concept of God “testing humanity by not revealing himself” does seem more like an example of Belief in belief, where P(T) was devised as a means to justify the existence of an invisible God, I still feel like the example you’ve given is a bit of a stretch.
I would say, rather, that:
G = God exists
N = The existence of God is not revealed directly to humanity
M = Miracles occur
...and we’re talking about P(G|N) and P(G|M) and not talking about P(T) at all.
More generally, T seems to be a red herring here.
That said, I agree that there’s a presumption that M implies ~N… that is, that if miracles occurred, that would constitute the direct revelation of God’s existence.
And yes, one could argue instead that no, miracles aren’t a revelation of God’s existence at all, but rather a test of faith. A lot depends here on what counts as a miracle; further discussion along this line would benefit from specificity.
I agree that T in and of itself is problematic.
Your N seems more likely what the author intended, now that you point it out.
Though I still don’t think anyone who thought about it for more than 20 seconds would ever assert that N could be used as evidence for G.
But using that as a model would probably serve well to underscore the point of Conservation of Evidence
If the fact that God has not been revealed directly to humanity is evidence for the existence of God. Then should God ever reveal himself directly to humanity, it would be evidence against his existence.
That’s probably the statement Eliezer intended to make.
(nods)
And I would not be in the least surprised to find theologians arguing that the absence of direct evidence of God’s existence is itself proof of the existence of God, and I would be somewhat surprised to find that none ever had, but I don’t have examples.
That said, straw theism is not particularly uncommon on LW; when people want a go-to example of invalid reasoning, belief in god comes readily to hand. It derives from a common cultural presumption of atheism, although there are some theists around.