To be frank, although I speak for myself and not lukeprog, framing the scientific method or world-view in terms of ‘naturalism,’ or in terms of a nature/‘supernature’ dichotomy, is a bad habit. I can’t say much more than that until you explain what you personally mean by ‘naturalism.’
I’m thinking of naturalism as broadly accepted by modern analytic philosophy, in Quine’s terms and in more modern constructions which emphasize i) that the natural world is the “only” world (this is not to be confused with a dualistic opposition to anything “supernatural”; the supernatural is simply ruled out as an option) and ii) that science is a preferred means of obtaining knowledge about said world.
I realize that’s less clear than you may want, but the vagueness of the term is part of why I found it objectionable to treat is as instilling “bad habits”.
Are you alluding to the fact that we all rely on intuitions in our everyday reason?
Well, indirectly, but the specific point was that the argument presented here is an intuition about what goes on in philosophy, what constitutes the current trends and debates within the discipline, and so on, and it appears to me that it is more strawman than a rigorous reply to those activities.
Given that it’s an intuition underpinning an article about the unreliability of intuitions, well...you can appreciate the meta-humor I found there.
It’s ‘Scrutinize intuitions to determine which ones we have reason to expect to match the contours of the territory.’
Of course, and as I’ve relayed in other comments, this is no insight to philosophers—philosophers already do this. We could of course point out instances where the philosopher’s argument is predicated on validating intutions, but even there you are guaranteed to see a more nuanced position than the uncritical acceptance of common-sense intuitions, and as such even those positions mandate more than a sweeping dismissal.
The successes of philosophy—successes like ‘science’ and ‘mathematics’ and ‘logic’—are formalized and heavily scrutinized networks of intuitions, intuitions that we have good empirical reason to think happen to be of a rare sort that correspond to the large-scale structure of reality.
And ethics/meta-ethics, moral theory, social theory, aesthetics...all of these are, at least in part, beyond the realm of the empirical, and it is a philosophical stance you have taken which puts them in the realm of the physical and empirical or else excludes their reality (if you go the eliminativist route).
These domains are arguably as successful at what they do as math and logic have been in their respective domains, and frankly they don’t operate anything like what you’ve described (re: empirically-discovered relations to the large scale of reality). This is part of why we need naturalistic philosophy, because without it you wind up with unabashed scientism like this, which sits right on the precipice of “ethical” choices which can be monstrous.
Personally I think even other forms of philosophy are not only useful, but what have been called “bad habits” by Eliezer et al. are actually central components of a lived human life. I wouldn’t be so hasty to get rid of them, and certainly not with such a sweeping set of dismissals about the primacy of science.
Define “natural world” so that it’s clearer how the above is non-tautological.
(this is not to be confused with a dualistic opposition to anything “supernatural”;
If you aren’t denying or opposing anything, then what work is “only” doing in the sense “the natural world is the only world”?
the supernatural is simply ruled out as an option)
What does it mean in this context to ‘rule out as an option’ something? How does this differ from ‘opposing’ an option?
and ii) that science is a preferred means of obtaining knowledge about said world.
Define ‘science,’ while you’re at it. Is looking out the window science? Is logical deduction science? Is logical deduction science when your premises are ‘about the world’? Same question for mathematical reasoning. I’d think most scientists in their daily lives would actually consider logical or mathematical reasoning stronger than, ‘preferred’ over, any scientific observation or theory.
I realize that’s less clear than you may want, but the vagueness of the term is part of why I found it objectionable to treat is as instilling “bad habits”.
The vagueness of the term ‘naturalism’ is the primary reason it’s a bad habit to define your methods or world-view in terms of it.
And ethics/meta-ethics, moral theory, social theory, aesthetics...all of these are, at least in part, beyond the realm of the empirical
I don’t know what you mean by ‘beyond the realm of the empirical.’ Plenty of logic and mathematics also transcends the observable. I think we’d get a lot further in this discussion if we started defining or tabooing ‘science,’ ‘philosophy,’ ‘empirical,’ ‘natural,’ etc.
This is part of why we need naturalistic philosophy, because without it you wind up with unabashed scientism like this, which sits right on the precipice of “ethical” choices which can be monstrous.
To be honest, this sentence here pretty much sums up what I think is wrong with modern philosophy. There is virtually no content to ‘naturalism’ or ‘scientism,’ beyond the fact that both are associated with science and the former has a positive connotation, while the latter has a negative connotation. Thus we see much of the modern philosophical (and pop-philosophical) discourse consumed in hand-wringing over whether something is ‘naturalistic’ (goodscience! happy face!) or whether something is ‘scientistic’ (badscience! frowny face!), and the whole framing does nothing but obscure what’s actually under debate. Any non-trivial definition of ‘naturalism’ and ‘scientism’ will allow that a reasonable scientist might be forced to forsake naturalism, or adopt scientism, in at least some circumstances; and any circular or otherwise trivial one is not worth discussing.
If you aren’t denying or opposing anything, then what work is “only” doing in the sense “the natural world is the only world”?
In that there is “no more than”, in ontological terms, there are no other fundamental categories of being. I don’t have to explicitly deny that unicorns exist in order to rule them out of any taxonomy of equine animals.
If you’ve presupposed a worldview that allows for “supernatural” or “mystical” or Cartesian mind-substance or what have you, then of course the opposition seems obvious, but modern analytical naturalism as it stands makes no such allowance. This is why we cannot take our presuppositions for granted.
Define ‘science,’ while you’re at it.
You don’t have the space on this forum for that debate. However, for pragmatic purposes, let’s (roughly) call it the social activity of institutionalized formal empirical inquiry, inclusive of the error-correcting norms and structures meant to filter our systematic errors.
The vagueness of the term ‘naturalism’ is the primary reason it’s a bad habit to define your methods or world-view in terms of it.
Maybe if you didn’t take flippant comments and run with them you wouldn’t encounter this problem. I brought up naturalism because I found it hilarious that “even modern analytic philosophy” teaches these laughably vague “bad habits”—which you still seem surprisingly unconcerned with, given the far more serious issues there—and contemporary naturalism as practiced by many philosophers in the English-speaking world is as pro-science a set of ideas as you’ll find.
Spiraling it out into this protracted debate about whether we can accurately define naturalism—on your terms, no less—is not the point of the exercise (and I suspect it’s only happened to take the focus off the matter at hand: that there is no adequate account of these “bad habits” and we’re seeing an interference play to keep eyes off it).
There is virtually no content to ‘naturalism’ or ‘scientism,’ beyond the fact that both are associated with science and the former has a positive connotation, while the latter has a negative connotation.
Yes I’m well aware of the dislike of anything intrinsically opposed to the formal and computable around these parts, and I also find that position to be laughable (and a shining example of why you folks need to engage with philosophy rather than jumping head-first into troubling [and equally laughable] moral-ethical positions).
But, as per the thread, there is a more interesting and proximate criticism: your intuitions on such are unreliable, by your own lights, so you’ll pardon me if I am hardly persuaded by your fiat declaration that i) there is “no content” to a whole wide-ranging debate (of which you seem barely familiar with, at that, with your introduction of yet another nonsensical opposition that might as well be fiction for all it reflects the actual process*) and ii) that we should—again by decree—paint as “useless” the tools and methods used to engage in the debate.
We are only fortunate that the actual intellectual world doesn’t conduct itself like a message board.
PS There is no serious debate “between” naturalism and scientism. The latter isn’t even a “position” as such, even less so than naturalism could be.
I’m thinking of naturalism as broadly accepted by modern analytic philosophy, in Quine’s terms and in more modern constructions which emphasize i) that the natural world is the “only” world (this is not to be confused with a dualistic opposition to anything “supernatural”; the supernatural is simply ruled out as an option) and ii) that science is a preferred means of obtaining knowledge about said world.
I realize that’s less clear than you may want, but the vagueness of the term is part of why I found it objectionable to treat is as instilling “bad habits”.
Well, indirectly, but the specific point was that the argument presented here is an intuition about what goes on in philosophy, what constitutes the current trends and debates within the discipline, and so on, and it appears to me that it is more strawman than a rigorous reply to those activities.
Given that it’s an intuition underpinning an article about the unreliability of intuitions, well...you can appreciate the meta-humor I found there.
Of course, and as I’ve relayed in other comments, this is no insight to philosophers—philosophers already do this. We could of course point out instances where the philosopher’s argument is predicated on validating intutions, but even there you are guaranteed to see a more nuanced position than the uncritical acceptance of common-sense intuitions, and as such even those positions mandate more than a sweeping dismissal.
And ethics/meta-ethics, moral theory, social theory, aesthetics...all of these are, at least in part, beyond the realm of the empirical, and it is a philosophical stance you have taken which puts them in the realm of the physical and empirical or else excludes their reality (if you go the eliminativist route).
These domains are arguably as successful at what they do as math and logic have been in their respective domains, and frankly they don’t operate anything like what you’ve described (re: empirically-discovered relations to the large scale of reality). This is part of why we need naturalistic philosophy, because without it you wind up with unabashed scientism like this, which sits right on the precipice of “ethical” choices which can be monstrous.
Personally I think even other forms of philosophy are not only useful, but what have been called “bad habits” by Eliezer et al. are actually central components of a lived human life. I wouldn’t be so hasty to get rid of them, and certainly not with such a sweeping set of dismissals about the primacy of science.
Define “natural world” so that it’s clearer how the above is non-tautological.
If you aren’t denying or opposing anything, then what work is “only” doing in the sense “the natural world is the only world”?
What does it mean in this context to ‘rule out as an option’ something? How does this differ from ‘opposing’ an option?
Define ‘science,’ while you’re at it. Is looking out the window science? Is logical deduction science? Is logical deduction science when your premises are ‘about the world’? Same question for mathematical reasoning. I’d think most scientists in their daily lives would actually consider logical or mathematical reasoning stronger than, ‘preferred’ over, any scientific observation or theory.
The vagueness of the term ‘naturalism’ is the primary reason it’s a bad habit to define your methods or world-view in terms of it.
I don’t know what you mean by ‘beyond the realm of the empirical.’ Plenty of logic and mathematics also transcends the observable. I think we’d get a lot further in this discussion if we started defining or tabooing ‘science,’ ‘philosophy,’ ‘empirical,’ ‘natural,’ etc.
To be honest, this sentence here pretty much sums up what I think is wrong with modern philosophy. There is virtually no content to ‘naturalism’ or ‘scientism,’ beyond the fact that both are associated with science and the former has a positive connotation, while the latter has a negative connotation. Thus we see much of the modern philosophical (and pop-philosophical) discourse consumed in hand-wringing over whether something is ‘naturalistic’ (goodscience! happy face!) or whether something is ‘scientistic’ (badscience! frowny face!), and the whole framing does nothing but obscure what’s actually under debate. Any non-trivial definition of ‘naturalism’ and ‘scientism’ will allow that a reasonable scientist might be forced to forsake naturalism, or adopt scientism, in at least some circumstances; and any circular or otherwise trivial one is not worth discussing.
In that there is “no more than”, in ontological terms, there are no other fundamental categories of being. I don’t have to explicitly deny that unicorns exist in order to rule them out of any taxonomy of equine animals.
If you’ve presupposed a worldview that allows for “supernatural” or “mystical” or Cartesian mind-substance or what have you, then of course the opposition seems obvious, but modern analytical naturalism as it stands makes no such allowance. This is why we cannot take our presuppositions for granted.
You don’t have the space on this forum for that debate. However, for pragmatic purposes, let’s (roughly) call it the social activity of institutionalized formal empirical inquiry, inclusive of the error-correcting norms and structures meant to filter our systematic errors.
Maybe if you didn’t take flippant comments and run with them you wouldn’t encounter this problem. I brought up naturalism because I found it hilarious that “even modern analytic philosophy” teaches these laughably vague “bad habits”—which you still seem surprisingly unconcerned with, given the far more serious issues there—and contemporary naturalism as practiced by many philosophers in the English-speaking world is as pro-science a set of ideas as you’ll find.
Spiraling it out into this protracted debate about whether we can accurately define naturalism—on your terms, no less—is not the point of the exercise (and I suspect it’s only happened to take the focus off the matter at hand: that there is no adequate account of these “bad habits” and we’re seeing an interference play to keep eyes off it).
Yes I’m well aware of the dislike of anything intrinsically opposed to the formal and computable around these parts, and I also find that position to be laughable (and a shining example of why you folks need to engage with philosophy rather than jumping head-first into troubling [and equally laughable] moral-ethical positions).
But, as per the thread, there is a more interesting and proximate criticism: your intuitions on such are unreliable, by your own lights, so you’ll pardon me if I am hardly persuaded by your fiat declaration that i) there is “no content” to a whole wide-ranging debate (of which you seem barely familiar with, at that, with your introduction of yet another nonsensical opposition that might as well be fiction for all it reflects the actual process*) and ii) that we should—again by decree—paint as “useless” the tools and methods used to engage in the debate.
We are only fortunate that the actual intellectual world doesn’t conduct itself like a message board.
PS There is no serious debate “between” naturalism and scientism. The latter isn’t even a “position” as such, even less so than naturalism could be.