To add to that, Oeberst (2023) argues that all cognitive biases at heart are just confirmation bias based around a few “fundamental prior” beliefs. (A “belief” would be a hypothesis about the world bundled with an accuracy.) The fundamental beliefs are:
My experience is a reasonable reference
I make correct assessments of the world
I am good
My group is a reasonable reference
My group (members) is (are) good
People’s attributes (not context) shape outcomes
That is obviously rather speculative, but I think it’s some further weak reason to think motivated reasoning is in some sense a fundamental problem of rationality.
To add to that, Oeberst (2023) argues that all cognitive biases at heart are just confirmation bias based around a few “fundamental prior” beliefs. (A “belief” would be a hypothesis about the world bundled with an accuracy.) The fundamental beliefs are:
My experience is a reasonable reference
I make correct assessments of the world
I am good
My group is a reasonable reference
My group (members) is (are) good
People’s attributes (not context) shape outcomes
That is obviously rather speculative, but I think it’s some further weak reason to think motivated reasoning is in some sense a fundamental problem of rationality.