I don’t understand. We should entertain the possibility because it is clearly possible (since it’s unfalsifiable), because I care about it, because it can dictate my actions, etc. And the probability argument follows after specifying a reference class, such as “being distinct” or “being a presumptuous philosopher.”
We should entertain the possibility because it is clearly possible (since it’s unfalsifiable), because I care about it, because it can dictate my actions, etc.
I don’t understand. We should entertain the possibility because it is clearly possible (since it’s unfalsifiable), because I care about it, because it can dictate my actions, etc. And the probability argument follows after specifying a reference class, such as “being distinct” or “being a presumptuous philosopher.”
What makes you care about it? What makes it persuasive to you? What decisions would you make differently and what tangible results within this presumed simulation would you expect to see differently pursuant to proving this? (How do you expect your belief in the simulation to pay rent in anticipated experiences?)
Also, the general consensus in rational or at least broadly in science is if something is unfalsifiable then it must not be entertained.
Say more? I don’t see how they are the same reference class.