You are misinterpreting the PP example. Consider the following two theories:
T1 : I’m the only one that exists, everyone else is an NPC
T2 : Everything is as expected, I’m not simulated.
Suppose for simplicity that both theories are equally likely. (This assumption really doesn’t matter.) If I define Presumptuous Philosopher=Distinct human like myself=1/(10,000) humans, then I get in most universes, I am indeed the only one, but regardless, most copies of myself are not simulated.
The implicit fear is that you are in a world which is manufactured because you, the presumed observer are so unique, right? Because you’re freakishly tall or whatever.
However, as per the anthropic principle, any universe that humans exist in, and any universe that observer exists in is a universe where it is possible for them to exist. Or to put it another way: the rules of that universe are such that the observer doesn’t defy the rules of that universe. Right?
So freakishly tall or average height: by the anthropic principle you are a possibility within that universe. (but, you are not the sole possibility in that universe—other observers are possible, non-human intelligent lifeforms aren’t impossible just because humans are)
Why should we entertain the possibility that you are not possible within this universe, and therefore that some sort of demiurge or AGI or whatever watchmaker-stand-in you want for this thought experiment has crafted a simulation just for the observer?
I don’t understand. We should entertain the possibility because it is clearly possible (since it’s unfalsifiable), because I care about it, because it can dictate my actions, etc. And the probability argument follows after specifying a reference class, such as “being distinct” or “being a presumptuous philosopher.”
We should entertain the possibility because it is clearly possible (since it’s unfalsifiable), because I care about it, because it can dictate my actions, etc.
You are misinterpreting the PP example. Consider the following two theories:
T1 : I’m the only one that exists, everyone else is an NPC
T2 : Everything is as expected, I’m not simulated.
Suppose for simplicity that both theories are equally likely. (This assumption really doesn’t matter.) If I define Presumptuous Philosopher=Distinct human like myself=1/(10,000) humans, then I get in most universes, I am indeed the only one, but regardless, most copies of myself are not simulated.
I’m still not sure how it is related.
The implicit fear is that you are in a world which is manufactured because you, the presumed observer are so unique, right? Because you’re freakishly tall or whatever.
However, as per the anthropic principle, any universe that humans exist in, and any universe that observer exists in is a universe where it is possible for them to exist. Or to put it another way: the rules of that universe are such that the observer doesn’t defy the rules of that universe. Right?
So freakishly tall or average height: by the anthropic principle you are a possibility within that universe. (but, you are not the sole possibility in that universe—other observers are possible, non-human intelligent lifeforms aren’t impossible just because humans are)
Why should we entertain the possibility that you are not possible within this universe, and therefore that some sort of demiurge or AGI or whatever watchmaker-stand-in you want for this thought experiment has crafted a simulation just for the observer?
How do we get that to the probability argument?
I don’t understand. We should entertain the possibility because it is clearly possible (since it’s unfalsifiable), because I care about it, because it can dictate my actions, etc. And the probability argument follows after specifying a reference class, such as “being distinct” or “being a presumptuous philosopher.”
What makes you care about it? What makes it persuasive to you? What decisions would you make differently and what tangible results within this presumed simulation would you expect to see differently pursuant to proving this? (How do you expect your belief in the simulation to pay rent in anticipated experiences?)
Also, the general consensus in rational or at least broadly in science is if something is unfalsifiable then it must not be entertained.
Say more? I don’t see how they are the same reference class.