Usually, predictive accuracy is used as a proxy for correspondence to reality, because one cannot check map-territory correspondence by standing outside the map-territory relationship and observing (in)congreuence directly.
There are caveats because e.g. you can never prove that a map is (entirely) correct, you can only prove that one is wrong—but these are not new and well-known.
Not saying your epsitemology can do things it can;’t do.
That doesn’t seem to be meaningful advice given how “X should not claim it can do things it can’t do” is right there near “You should do good things and not do bad things”.
In Science and Sanity “The map is not the territory” isn’t a statement that means that the map can never be correct but is always wrong but that it’s not meaningful to call a map right or wrong.
Instead of being right or wrong different maps have more or less correspondence to reality and to other maps.
Usually, predictive accuracy is used as a proxy for correspondence to reality, because one cannot check map-territory correspondence by standing outside the map-territory relationship and observing (in)congreuence directly.
Right.
There are caveats because e.g. you can never prove that a map is (entirely) correct, you can only prove that one is wrong—but these are not new and well-known.
It’s worse than that , and they’re not widely enough know
Eh. “All models are wrong but some are useful”.
Do you happen to have alternatives?
Not saying your epsitemology can do things it can;’t do.
Motte: We can prove things about reality.
Bailey: We can predict obervations.
That doesn’t seem to be meaningful advice given how “X should not claim it can do things it can’t do” is right there near “You should do good things and not do bad things”.
And aren’t your motte & bailey switched around?
You know that is not universally followed?
I could never imagine such a thing! Next thing you’ll be telling me that people do stupid things on a regular basis :-P
In Science and Sanity “The map is not the territory” isn’t a statement that means that the map can never be correct but is always wrong but that it’s not meaningful to call a map right or wrong. Instead of being right or wrong different maps have more or less correspondence to reality and to other maps.
Why would one care about correspondence to other maps?