The only problem with epiphenomenalist theories of consciousness is that the thing we call consciousness does have an effect on our actions (proof: answer the question “how do you know you’re conscious?” out loud), so the thing they call “consciousness” must be something different. However, these rules don’t say that this thing is impossible or meaningless; by definition, it’s caused by neurons, and so (if it actually happens) would be causally linked to reality, and hence meet the criteria for being “real”.
The only problem with epiphenomenalist theories of consciousness is that the thing we call consciousness does have an effect on our actions (proof: answer the question “how do you know you’re conscious?” out loud), so the thing they call “consciousness” must be something different. However, these rules don’t say that this thing is impossible or meaningless; by definition, it’s caused by neurons, and so (if it actually happens) would be causally linked to reality, and hence meet the criteria for being “real”.