You can account for a theory where neurons cause consciousness, and where consciousness has no further effects, by drawing a causal graph like
(universe)->(consciousness)
where each bracketed bit is short-hand for a possibly large number of nodes, and likewise the → is short for a possibly large number of arrows, and then you can certainly trace forward along causal links from “you” to “consciousness”, so it’s meaningful. And indeed for the same reason that “the ship doesn’t disappear when it crosses the horizon” is meaningful.
We reject epiphenomenal theories of consiousness because the causal model without the (consciousness) subgraph is more simpler than the one with it, and we have no evidence for the latter to overcome this prior improbability. This is of course the exact same reason why we accept that the ship still exists after it crosses the horizon.
You can account for a theory where neurons cause consciousness, and where consciousness has no further effects, by drawing a causal graph like
(universe)->(consciousness)
where each bracketed bit is short-hand for a possibly large number of nodes, and likewise the → is short for a possibly large number of arrows, and then you can certainly trace forward along causal links from “you” to “consciousness”, so it’s meaningful. And indeed for the same reason that “the ship doesn’t disappear when it crosses the horizon” is meaningful.
We reject epiphenomenal theories of consiousness because the causal model without the (consciousness) subgraph is more simpler than the one with it, and we have no evidence for the latter to overcome this prior improbability. This is of course the exact same reason why we accept that the ship still exists after it crosses the horizon.