By all means, strategically violate social customs. But if you irritate people by doing it, you may be advancing your own epistemics by making them talk to you, but you’re actually hurting their epistemics by making them irritated with whatever belief you’re trying to pitch. Lack of social grace is very much not an epistemic virtue.
This post captures a fairly common belief in the rationalist community. It’s important to understand why it’s wrong.
Emotions play a strong role in human reasoning. I finally wrote up at least a little sketch of why that happens. The technical term is motivated reasoning.
By all means, strategically violate social customs. But if you irritate people by doing it, you may be advancing your own epistemics by making them talk to you, but you’re actually hurting their epistemics by making them irritated with whatever belief you’re trying to pitch. Lack of social grace is very much not an epistemic virtue.
This post captures a fairly common belief in the rationalist community. It’s important to understand why it’s wrong.
Emotions play a strong role in human reasoning. I finally wrote up at least a little sketch of why that happens. The technical term is motivated reasoning.
Motivated reasoning/confirmation bias as the most important cognitive bias