Perhaps I’ve missed the point of your post, but to me the whole confusion around Gender is not internal validity, after all circular definitions are valid—but not convincing to the outside view.
I see the two main arguments of the book as 1) we should understand “gender identity” as a bunch of subjective feelings about various traits, which may or may not cohere into an introspectively accessible “identity”; 2) we can understand gender categories as a particular kind of irreducible category (namely historical lineages) to which membership is granted by community consensus, the categories being “irreducible” in that they are not defined by additional facts about their members. These stand or fall independently of whether we accept gender self-id, although self-id is compatible with BG’s understanding of categories in a way that it is not necessarily with clusters.
See the last section of the review for reasons why we might sometimes prefer BG’s analysis of categories on the outside view; I think it’s potentially more useful for thinking about the role of categories in society and in people’s lives. I agree this is not a knockdown case, but I certainly think it’s a better framework than e.g. “men are those with the essential spirit of man-ness inside them,” which is also coherent but not very interesting.
Perhaps I’ve missed the point of your post, but to me the whole confusion around Gender is not internal validity, after all circular definitions are valid—but not convincing to the outside view.
I see the two main arguments of the book as 1) we should understand “gender identity” as a bunch of subjective feelings about various traits, which may or may not cohere into an introspectively accessible “identity”; 2) we can understand gender categories as a particular kind of irreducible category (namely historical lineages) to which membership is granted by community consensus, the categories being “irreducible” in that they are not defined by additional facts about their members. These stand or fall independently of whether we accept gender self-id, although self-id is compatible with BG’s understanding of categories in a way that it is not necessarily with clusters.
See the last section of the review for reasons why we might sometimes prefer BG’s analysis of categories on the outside view; I think it’s potentially more useful for thinking about the role of categories in society and in people’s lives. I agree this is not a knockdown case, but I certainly think it’s a better framework than e.g. “men are those with the essential spirit of man-ness inside them,” which is also coherent but not very interesting.