I think there are a lot of dynamics present here that aren’t present in the classic prisoners dilemma, and some dynamics that are present (and some that are present in various iterated prisoner’s dilemmas). The prize might be different for different actors, since actors place different value of “cooperative” outcomes. If you can trust people’s precommitments, I think there is a race to commit OR precommit to an action.
E.g. if I wanted the game to settle with no nukes launched, then I could pre-commit to launching a retaliatory strike to either side if an attack was launched.
I think there are a lot of dynamics present here that aren’t present in the classic prisoners dilemma, and some dynamics that are present (and some that are present in various iterated prisoner’s dilemmas). The prize might be different for different actors, since actors place different value of “cooperative” outcomes. If you can trust people’s precommitments, I think there is a race to commit OR precommit to an action.
E.g. if I wanted the game to settle with no nukes launched, then I could pre-commit to launching a retaliatory strike to either side if an attack was launched.