I would not say that maximizing happiness is a higher goal than perceiving reality correctly.
I think maximizing happiness is a goal related to instrumental rationality, while perceiving reality correctly IS epistemic rationality. And epistemic rationality is a fundamental requirement for any intrumental goals.
But it doesnt mean perceiving reality correctly is a lower goal than other intrumental goals right? How do you even rank goals in the first place?
Robin, it’s easy to see that of the two goals of maximizing either happiness or one’s own ability to perceive reality correctly,
Anyone can easily imagine wanting to maximize perceiving reality correctly IN ORDER TO maximize one’s happiness.
But one can’t imagine wanting to maximize one’s happiness IN ORDER TO maximize perceiving reality correctly.
The latter statement makes no sense, or if you force some sense upon it by scenario-making, it still makes a very limited kind of sense.
It seems to me that this proves that maximizing happiness is a higher goal than perceiving reality correctly.
Not one of my own, Aristotle’s.
I would not say that maximizing happiness is a higher goal than perceiving reality correctly.
I think maximizing happiness is a goal related to instrumental rationality, while perceiving reality correctly IS epistemic rationality. And epistemic rationality is a fundamental requirement for any intrumental goals.
But it doesnt mean perceiving reality correctly is a lower goal than other intrumental goals right? How do you even rank goals in the first place?