I’m sorry; re-reading my comment, I think it wasn’t clear. I didn’t intend to ask which is better, but to arise the following question: Is it possible that whenever I have to decide between rational or reasonable predominance, that decission entails an a-priori decission of one over the other, since each criterion might point towards itself?… it just seemed fun to think about it.
By the way, I’m curious about the Way to which you are referring with a capital W. Is that something like rationality commandments?
It’s something Eliezer talks about in some posts; I associate it mainly with The Twelve Virtues and this:
Some people, I suspect, may object that curiosity is an emotion and is therefore “not rational”. I label an emotion as “not rational” if it rests on mistaken beliefs, or rather, on irrational epistemic conduct: “If the iron approaches your face, and you believe it is hot, and it is cool, the Way opposes your fear. If the iron approaches your face, and you believe it is cool, and it is hot, the Way opposes your calm.”
I’m sorry; re-reading my comment, I think it wasn’t clear. I didn’t intend to ask which is better, but to arise the following question: Is it possible that whenever I have to decide between rational or reasonable predominance, that decission entails an a-priori decission of one over the other, since each criterion might point towards itself?… it just seemed fun to think about it.
By the way, I’m curious about the Way to which you are referring with a capital W. Is that something like rationality commandments?
It’s something Eliezer talks about in some posts; I associate it mainly with The Twelve Virtues and this: