This was a good post, and shifted my view slightly on accelerating vs halting AI capabilities progress.
I was confused by your “overhang” argument all the way until footnote 9, but I think I have the gist. You’re saying that even if absolute progress in capabilities increases as a result of earlier investment, progress relative to safety will be slower.
A key assumption seems to be that we are not expecting doom immediately; i.e. the next major jump in capabilities is deemed nearly impossible to kill us all with misaligned AI. I’m not sure I buy this assumption fully; it seems to have non-negligible probability to me and that seems relevant to the wisdom of endorsing faster progress in capabilities.
But if we assume the next jump in capabilities, or the next low-hanging fruit plucked by investment, won’t be the beginning of the end...then it does sorta make sense that accelerating capabilities in the short run might accelerate safety and policy enough to compensate.
This was a good post, and shifted my view slightly on accelerating vs halting AI capabilities progress.
I was confused by your “overhang” argument all the way until footnote 9, but I think I have the gist. You’re saying that even if absolute progress in capabilities increases as a result of earlier investment, progress relative to safety will be slower.
A key assumption seems to be that we are not expecting doom immediately; i.e. the next major jump in capabilities is deemed nearly impossible to kill us all with misaligned AI. I’m not sure I buy this assumption fully; it seems to have non-negligible probability to me and that seems relevant to the wisdom of endorsing faster progress in capabilities.
But if we assume the next jump in capabilities, or the next low-hanging fruit plucked by investment, won’t be the beginning of the end...then it does sorta make sense that accelerating capabilities in the short run might accelerate safety and policy enough to compensate.