I’m already familiar, at least at that level, with dissociation, derealization, and depersonalization. That said, the claim made in the OP, and in the article Kaj Sota links echoing the same viewpoint, seems to be less that there are emotions dealt with in unhealthy ways within the sequences, and more that there are no emotions at all in the sequences, that rationalism is a project to replace all intuitive/automatic/uncontrolled processing with explicit/intentional/controlled processing.
Personally I think the construct actually being discussed seems more like avoidance than “embodiment” or dissociation. Clinically, dissociation tends to be very severe; when clinicians talk about PTSD survivors feeling “disembodied,” they’re referring to tactile hallucinations representing a noticeable disruption of one or more senses. I think your post is similarly a much more expansive reading of the clinical definitions, though IANApsychiatrist.
I’m already familiar, at least at that level, with dissociation, derealization, and depersonalization. That said, the claim made in the OP, and in the article Kaj Sota links echoing the same viewpoint, seems to be less that there are emotions dealt with in unhealthy ways within the sequences, and more that there are no emotions at all in the sequences, that rationalism is a project to replace all intuitive/automatic/uncontrolled processing with explicit/intentional/controlled processing.
Personally I think the construct actually being discussed seems more like avoidance than “embodiment” or dissociation. Clinically, dissociation tends to be very severe; when clinicians talk about PTSD survivors feeling “disembodied,” they’re referring to tactile hallucinations representing a noticeable disruption of one or more senses. I think your post is similarly a much more expansive reading of the clinical definitions, though IANApsychiatrist.
Yes, I agree. I think I say as much in the post itself.