So if the sequences are unemotional, they’re disembodied, but if they are emotional, they’re also disembodied?
Edit: In hindsight I’m conflating the article Kaj Sota links and the OP’s tweets about the sequences keeping emotion “at an arm’s length.” I don’t really agree that the sequences keep emotions at an arm’s length, but sure, if this is not the same thing as being “disembodied,” they might still be emotional and disembodied.
That said, what is the test that tells us something is not disembodied? Is any attempt to improve one’s life through reason on its own evidence for disembodiment? What does the alternate-universe “embodied” version of the sequences look like?
The word disembodied is more about how people relate to their emotions than whether or not they have them.
If I imagine myself 15 years ago, I don’t think it would have been easy for me to grasp what people mean when they do speak about disembodied in a case like this. There’s probably room for a good post that explains the concept.
I framed it another way, but I made a whole post about who lot of people, including non-rationalists, are disembodied in a variety of ways, although I use a different term to describe it. See “You are Dissociating (probably)”. Maybe that will help clear up some of the confusion about what people mean when they say “disembodied”.
I’m already familiar, at least at that level, with dissociation, derealization, and depersonalization. That said, the claim made in the OP, and in the article Kaj Sota links echoing the same viewpoint, seems to be less that there are emotions dealt with in unhealthy ways within the sequences, and more that there are no emotions at all in the sequences, that rationalism is a project to replace all intuitive/automatic/uncontrolled processing with explicit/intentional/controlled processing.
Personally I think the construct actually being discussed seems more like avoidance than “embodiment” or dissociation. Clinically, dissociation tends to be very severe; when clinicians talk about PTSD survivors feeling “disembodied,” they’re referring to tactile hallucinations representing a noticeable disruption of one or more senses. I think your post is similarly a much more expansive reading of the clinical definitions, though IANApsychiatrist.
What is the appropriate way to relate to emotions? How could the sequences have avoided disembodiment? The person who originally used that term seems to think that anything like the sequences would be similarly “disembodied,” which makes me think that this issue is less about the inappropriate way the sequences relate to emotion, and more about the hubris of attempting to self-improve in ways other than those described in The Tao of Fully Feeling.
So if the sequences are unemotional, they’re disembodied, but if they are emotional, they’re also disembodied?
Edit: In hindsight I’m conflating the article Kaj Sota links and the OP’s tweets about the sequences keeping emotion “at an arm’s length.” I don’t really agree that the sequences keep emotions at an arm’s length, but sure, if this is not the same thing as being “disembodied,” they might still be emotional and disembodied.
That said, what is the test that tells us something is not disembodied? Is any attempt to improve one’s life through reason on its own evidence for disembodiment? What does the alternate-universe “embodied” version of the sequences look like?
The word disembodied is more about how people relate to their emotions than whether or not they have them.
If I imagine myself 15 years ago, I don’t think it would have been easy for me to grasp what people mean when they do speak about disembodied in a case like this. There’s probably room for a good post that explains the concept.
I framed it another way, but I made a whole post about who lot of people, including non-rationalists, are disembodied in a variety of ways, although I use a different term to describe it. See “You are Dissociating (probably)”. Maybe that will help clear up some of the confusion about what people mean when they say “disembodied”.
I’m already familiar, at least at that level, with dissociation, derealization, and depersonalization. That said, the claim made in the OP, and in the article Kaj Sota links echoing the same viewpoint, seems to be less that there are emotions dealt with in unhealthy ways within the sequences, and more that there are no emotions at all in the sequences, that rationalism is a project to replace all intuitive/automatic/uncontrolled processing with explicit/intentional/controlled processing.
Personally I think the construct actually being discussed seems more like avoidance than “embodiment” or dissociation. Clinically, dissociation tends to be very severe; when clinicians talk about PTSD survivors feeling “disembodied,” they’re referring to tactile hallucinations representing a noticeable disruption of one or more senses. I think your post is similarly a much more expansive reading of the clinical definitions, though IANApsychiatrist.
Yes, I agree. I think I say as much in the post itself.
If the sequences relate to emotions from a disembodied frame, they’re disembodied.
What is the appropriate way to relate to emotions? How could the sequences have avoided disembodiment? The person who originally used that term seems to think that anything like the sequences would be similarly “disembodied,” which makes me think that this issue is less about the inappropriate way the sequences relate to emotion, and more about the hubris of attempting to self-improve in ways other than those described in The Tao of Fully Feeling.
I think there are other things like the sequences around that are much more embodied.
Examples?