(Self-review.) I claim that this post is significant for articulating a solution to the mystery of disagreement (why people seem to believe different things, in flagrant violation of Aumann’s agreement theorem): much of the mystery dissolves if a lot of apparent “disagreements” are actually disguised conflicts. The basic idea isn’t particularly original, but I’m proud of the synthesis and writeup. Arguing that the distinction between deception and bias is less decision-relevant than commonly believed seems like an improvement over hang-wringing over where the boundary is.
I think that a lot of disagreements are truly hidden conflicts, but I also do think that a non-trivial portion of disagreements come down to not having common priors, which is necessary for the theorem to work for disagreements.
(Self-review.) I claim that this post is significant for articulating a solution to the mystery of disagreement (why people seem to believe different things, in flagrant violation of Aumann’s agreement theorem): much of the mystery dissolves if a lot of apparent “disagreements” are actually disguised conflicts. The basic idea isn’t particularly original, but I’m proud of the synthesis and writeup. Arguing that the distinction between deception and bias is less decision-relevant than commonly believed seems like an improvement over hang-wringing over where the boundary is.
I think that a lot of disagreements are truly hidden conflicts, but I also do think that a non-trivial portion of disagreements come down to not having common priors, which is necessary for the theorem to work for disagreements.