This is mostly a semantical question, as different compatibilist philosophers might use the words “having a will” to mean different things. (They are not words with a fixed technical meaning in philosophy). Some may think “having a will” is synonymous with “having free will”, while others might think that e.g. if you a mind-controlled without knowing it you might “have a will” (a subjective sense of willing to do things) while not satisfying the conditions for compatibilist free will.
Does compatibilism recognize a difference between “we have free will” and “we have a will”?
This is mostly a semantical question, as different compatibilist philosophers might use the words “having a will” to mean different things. (They are not words with a fixed technical meaning in philosophy). Some may think “having a will” is synonymous with “having free will”, while others might think that e.g. if you a mind-controlled without knowing it you might “have a will” (a subjective sense of willing to do things) while not satisfying the conditions for compatibilist free will.